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THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE CRISIS
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN RUSSIA
Robert A. Kushen"
As the Soviet Union and its successor states have lurched
from crisis to crisis since the mid-1980s, the criminal justice
system has also experienced upheaval, its ideological underpin-
nings revealed to be bankrupt-its "scientific basis" a fiction.
The use of the death penalty, never comfortably explained
under the old ideology, appears even more awkward today,
reduced in scope but just as resistant to total abolition.
This article examines the use of the death penalty in the
former Soviet Union and in the contemporary Russian Federa-,
tion.1 Part I examines the history of the death penalty in the
Soviet Union and Russia and the divergence between the
Marxist-Leninist ideology of criminal justice and its practice.
In the Soviet Union, an abstract political philosophy that was
* Attorney Adviser, Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Law
Enforcement and Intelligence. J.D., Columbia Law School 1989. B.A., Russian and
Soviet Studies, Harvard College, 1984. The views expressed in this article are
those of the author and are not intended to reflect the views of the United States
government.
1. I focus on Russia out of the fifteen successor states to the Soviet Union
because, until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it was Russia that dictated
the development of the criminal justice system and the use of the death penalty.
As the largest by far of the successor states, with a population of 146,500,000 out
of 289,000,000 of the former Soviet Union, Russia will probably continue to hand
down and carry out the largest number of death sentences. It is also in Russia
that the abolitionist movement is the most vital, and where the debate over the
abolition of the death penalty is the most visible.
Except where noted, the discussion on the history of the death penalty in
the Soviet Union also focuses on the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
(RSFSR). The RSFSR actually predates the Soviet Union. The Republic was pro-
claimed after the Bolshevik takeover in 1917; the Soviet Union, incorporating the
RSFSR and other regions, in 1922. Although each republic nominally maintained
its own criminal codes and justice system, with USSR law providing overall guid-
ance, the codes and systems were largely the same, and the codes and practice in
the RSFSR were also the norm elsewhere in the Soviet Union.
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a bad fit to reality was manipulated by Soviet leaders to justify
the execution of millions. These executions were carried out
both extrajudicially and through a criminal justice system that
was so corrupt that there was often little practical distinction
between an extrajudicial execution and one that was the result
of criminal processes. Throughout the Soviet period, Commu-
nist Party and government ideologues and criminal justice
scholars struggled, at times sincerely and at times cynically, to
make the use of the death penalty fit the official notion of the
creation of a communist utopia.
The impossibility of this fit was evidenced by the shifting
course of the legal treatment of the death penalty: it was abol-
ished four times between 1917 and 1950, and prescribed at
other times for a variety of crimes including robbery, murder,
bribe-taking, and treason. Discomfort with the death penalty
was also evidenced by its frequent characterization in the crim-
inal statutes as a temporary and extraordinary form of punish-
ment. Despite this ambivalence in the statutes, the death pen-
alty was implemented with gusto.
Part II of this article examines the collapse of the ideologi-
cal underpinnings of the Soviet criminal justice system in the
Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras and the efforts to reform it. Reve-
lations of past abuses in the criminal justice system, dating
back to the origins of the Soviet state, created grave popular
doubts about the fairness of the present system. Unlike the
revelations of the Khrushchev era, however, these revelations
were not limited to the crimes of Stalin, but reached back to
the beginning of the Soviet state and forward to the present
day. The criminal justice system was revealed to be in many
cases a farce, with poorly trained judges manipulated by a
powerful procuracy and subject to intervention by a Commu-
nist bureaucracy that dispensed "telephone justice."2 Due pro-
cess in this system was virtually nonexistent; the defense bar
2. Telephone justice (telefonnoe pravo) is the phrase given to the practice of
Communist Party or government officials dictating the desired outcome in a partic-
ular case, frequently by telephoning the judge. See George P. Fletcher,' In
Gorbachev's Courts, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 18, 1989, at 13.
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served as little more than a means to speed up the processing
of criminal cases. The penal system was revealed as a thor-
oughly corrupt enterprise, created for the purpose of stoking
the economic fires of the Soviet Union. The protection of
prisoners' rights was entrusted to the procuracy, whose prima-
ry goal was to put those prisoners in the system' in the first
place.
The end of the Gorbachev era and the first two years of
the Yeltsin government in Russia have seen some steps taken
to reform the criminal justice system, to protect the rights of
the accused and the incarcerated. Political prisoners in Russia
have almost disappeared, some political crimes have been
eliminated from the Russian criminal code, due process rights
have been strengthened statutorily, and the conditions for
incarcerated prisoners have improved.
Part I examines how the movement for criminal justice
reform has affected the use of the death penalty, which is
openly debated on the political level and in the popular and
scholarly media. The number of capital crimes has decreased
slightly, and in practice only intentional murder is today pun-
ished by death. Just as important, there has developed a vital
lobby for the abolition of the death penalty.
Despite these gains, the criminal justice system remains
plagued by incompetence, corruption, and a legal regime that
does not afford adequate due process to defendants and that
mistreats convicts. The death penalty remains as well, cur-
tailed, but resistant to abolition, despite the lack of any evi-
dence that it serves a deterrent effect. In the face of mounting
social and economic problems and a rising crime rate, the de-
bate over criminal justice reform and the abolition of the death
penalty has become highly politicized, with reformers fighting
to protect the few gains that have been achieved. The death
penalty has become an important symbol of the political strug-
gle. For this reason, while the use of the death penalty may
continue to be tacitly circumscribed, statutory abolition is* un-
likely for the near future.
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I. HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN RussIA AND THE
SOVIET UNION
The official ambivalence accorded the death penalty has a
deep tradition in Russian history. The death penalty was not
provided for in the Russkaia Pravda of Kievan Rus'.' Mikhail
Romanov promised the Boyars immunity from the death penal-
ty when he became Tsar,' but the number of death penalty
offenses began to mushroom soon after. Elizaveta Petrovna
supposedly abolished the death penalty by decree in the middle
of the eighteenth century,' but did not succeed in ending its
use. Catherine the Great, reared on French Enlightenment
philosophers such as Montesquieu, Beccaria, and others,6 also
sought to limit the death penalty and wrote in favor of its
abolition in her Instruction to the Legislative Commission of 1767"
3. 3 GEORGE VERNADSKY & MICHAEL KARPOVICH, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA; THE
MONGOLS AND RussIA 355-56 (1943).
4. 3 V. KLIUCHEVSKI, KURS- RUSSKOI ISTOR 94 (1908), translated in 3 V.
KLIUCHEVSKII, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 74-75 (1913), cited in Will Adams, Capital
Punishment in Imperial and Soviet Criminal Law, 18 Am. J. COLiP. L. 575, 576
(1970).
5. Id. at 576; EKATERINA II, NAKAZ KOUMISSII 0 SOSTAVLENII PROEKTA
NOVAGO ULOZHENIIA, translated in 2 RUSSIA UNDER CATHERINE THE GREAT:
CATHERINE THE GREATS INSTRUCTION (NAKAZ) TO THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION,
1767, at 70, art. 210 (Dr. Paul Dukes ed., 1977) [hereinafter NAKAZI. In speaking
of the ideal society where the death penalty is abolished, Catherine wrote that
"Twenty Years Reign of the Empress Eliz. Petrovna present the Fathers of the
People with an Example for Imitation more Illustrious than the brightest
Conquests." Id.
6. HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF
SOVIET LAW 205 (rev. ed. 1963).
7. NAKAZ', supra note 5, at 50-51, 70, 72, arts. 79, 209-212, 223. In article
'79, Catherine wrote that the death penalty is appropriate only in cases of murder
and attempted murder, and suggested the retributive nature of the penalty. "A
Citizen becomes worthy of Death when he has so far violated the Security of
another as to have taken away or attempted to take away his life. The Punish-
ment of Death is a kind of Medicine for a Sick Community." NAKAZ , supra. note
5, at 50-51.
In article 210, she appeared to narrow the use of the death penalty still
further (although, alternatively, it could be viewed as expanding the penalty) to
those cases where, "When being deprived of liberty, [a criminal] still has Means
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Historically, the Russian intelligentsia was also sympa-
thetic to the abolition of the death penalty. Dostoevsky and
Tolstoy, to name just a couple, were vocal opponents of the
death penalty.'
Despite this history of abolitionist sentiment, the death
penalty was used on and off throughout pre-revolutionary
Russia.' It appeared in Russian criminal codes at the end of
the fourteenth century, introduced to Muscovy by the Mon-
gols.'0 The number of capital crimes peaked during the reign
of Peter the Great." After disappearing from the civilian (but
not the military) criminal codes, the death penalty reappeared
in the Speranskii code of 1833, and remained on the books.2
until the 1917 revolution.'
In February 1917 the Provisional Government that re-
placed Tsar Nikolai II abolished the death penalty. 3 Within
and force capable of disturbing the public Tranquillity." She concluded, however,
that "during a peaceful Sovereignty of the Laws, under a form of Government es-
tablished by the united Wishes of the People . . . Where the whole Power is in
the hands of the Sovereign . . . there can be no Necessity to take away the life of
a Citizen."
As a more effective alternative to the death penalty, and presaging the
Soviet penal system of forced labor, Catherine recommended in article 212 "hard
Labour during the whole duration of his Life, to make amends for the Injury he
has done to the Public."
8. See, e.g., Count Lev N. Tolstoy, Thou Shalt Not Kill, in 23 THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF COUNT TOLSTOY 167 (Leo Wiener ed. & trans., 1968).
Dostoevsky was himself ostensibly sentenced to death for political activity.
As he and his compatriots stood before the firing squad, a messenger rushed in
with news that the sentences had been commuted by the Tsar. In fact, the whole
episode was staged to demonstrate the Tsar's humanity. See Letter from Fyodor
Dostoevsky to Mikhail Dostoevsky (Dec. 22, 1849) in 28 POLNOE SOBRANIE
SOCHINENII V TRIDTSATI TOMAIKH 161, 161-62 (1985), translated in 1 FYODOR
DOSTOEVSKY: COMPLETE LETIERS 178 (David Lowe & Ronald Meyer eds. & trans.,
1988).
9. Adams, supra note 4, at 578.
10. VERNADSKY & KARPOVICH, supra note 3, at 355.
11. Adams, supra note 4, at 576; VERNADSKY & KARPOVICH, supra note 3, at
58, 63.
12. Adams, supra note 4, at 576-78.
13. See Postanovlenie ob- otmene smertnoi kazni [Resolution On the Abolition
of the Death Penalty], Mar. 12, 1917, Sbornik ukazov- i postanovlenUi vremennago
pravitel'stva, 27 Fevralia-5 Maia 1917 g., Issue No. 16, at 37 [hereinafter
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five months, however, it was restored at the military front, in a
vain attempt to establish order in the crumbling Russian ar-
my.14 The death penalty was abolished again by the Second
Congress of Soviets immediately after the October Revolu-
tion. 5 This abolition was also short-lived, and the death pen-
alty was quickly restored in an ad hoc fashion in the middle of
1918 at the height of the Civil War. 6 In 1920 the death pen-
Sbornik], translated in 1 THE RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1917: DOCU-
MENTS 199-200 (Robert P. Browder & Alexander F. Kerensky eds., 1961) [hereinaf-
ter RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT].
A note on translating legal terms: The use in the Soviet and Russian legal
system of various words to describe executive or legislative acts has changed- over
the years without consistency, wreaking havoc with translators, and reflects the
ever-changing structure of the government. Thus "ukaz" was at one time used to
describe an act of the Supreme Soviet, supposedly a legislative body, but in recent
times has been used to describe an act of the President. In this article I have
chosen to translate "postanovlenie" as "resolution," "ukaz" and "dekreV' both as
"decree," and "zakon" as "law," regardless of which governmental body was respon-
sible for their promulgation.
14. See The Restoration of the Death Penalty in Wartime for Military Person-
nel and the Establishment of Military-Revolutionary Courts, Sobranie uzakonenil i
rasporiazhenii vremennago pravitel'stva, Issue No. 2, Item No. 974 (1917), trans-
lated in 2 RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 13, at 982-84.
15. See Postanovlenie Vtorogo Vserossiiskogo Sezda Sovetov ob otmene
smertnoi kazni [Resolution of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the
Abolition of the Death Penalty], I Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazhenii rabochago i
krest'ianskago pravitel'stva RSFSR [SU RSFSR], Issue No. 1, Item No. 10 (1917).
See also RICHARD PIPES, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 791 (1990).
16. Adams, supra note 4, at 580; PIPES, supra note 15, at 791, 798. Although
Adams writes that no single decree restored the death penalty at this time, Pipes
cites an oblique Resolution from the Commissar of Justice, P.I. Stuchka, freeing
the Revolutionary Tribunals to impose any sentence they saw fit, regardless of any
prior law, as long as the sentence was equal to or greater than the punishment
prescribed by law. See also Dekret Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov,
sotsialisticheskoe otechestvo v opasnosti! [Decree of the Council of People's Com-
missars, The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger!, I Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti [De-
crees of the Soviet Government], 25 oktiabria 1917 g.-16 marta 1918 g., Item No.
314, at 490 (1957) (decreeing immediate execution by shooting of "unfriendly
agents, speculators, burglars, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators and Ger-
man spies") [hereinafter Socialist Fatherland Decree].
In August 1918 Lenin advocated execution as punishment for those who did
not issue receipts for the compulsory requisition of grain and other products.
Vladimir I. Lenin, Tezisy po prodovol'stvennomu voprosu [Theses on the Food Ques.
tion], in 37 POLNOE SOBRANIE SOCHINENII 31, 32 (5th ed. 1969), translated in 28
COLLECTED WORKS 45, 46 (4th ed. 1980).
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alty was again supposedly abolished, 17 but this abolition was
to last less than four months. The next and last abolition of
the death penalty occurred in 1947, in honor of the Allied vic-
tory in World War HI.18 This abolition lasted three years, with
the death penalty reinstated in 1950."9
These frequent and unsuccessful attempts to abolish the
death penalty reflect the weak pedigree of abolition in Marxist-
In September 1918 the Commissar of Justice Kurskii issued his famous
resolution on the "Red Terror," which authorized the "shooting of those persons,
connected to white guard organizations, conspiracies and sedition" and the pub-
lication of their names (presumably for deterrent effect). Postanovlenie o krasnom
terrore [Resolution on the Red Terror], SU SSSR, Issue No. 65, Item No. 710
(1918), translated in part in IDEAS AND FORCES IN SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY: A
READER ON THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW 103 (Zigurds L. Zile ed., 1992).
By 1919 the death penalty had reappeared in the first "Fundamentals" of
Soviet criminal legislation. See Rukovodiashchie nachala po ugolovnomu pravu
RSFSR [Governing Principles of the Criminal Law of the RSFSR], Item No. 25,
SU RSFSR, Issue No. 66, Item No. 590 (1919) (providing for death by shooting as
one of the forms of punishment).
17. See Postanovlenie Vserossiiskogo Tsentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta
Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov ob otmene premeneniia vysshei mery nakazaniia
(rasstrely) [Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of
People's Comnissars On the Abolition of the Use of the Highest Form of Pdnish-
ment (Shooting)], SU RSFSR, Issue Nos. 4-5, Item No. 22 (1920). This decree
explained that the reason for the abolition was that the successful "destruction of
the most important secret organizations of counter-revolutionaries and bandits" and
the resultant "strengthening of Soviet power" rendered the death penalty unnec-
essary in combatting threats to the country. One commentator suggests that the
true reason was to encourage the desertion of enemy troops by lessening the pen-
alties they faced if they surrendered. See Adams, supra note 4, at 580.
18. See Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ob otmene smertnoi kazni
[Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the Abolition of
the Death Penalty], Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [Vedomosti SSSR], Issue
No. 17 (1947), reprinted in Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov prezidiuma
verkhovnogo soveta SSSR (1938 g.-noiabr' 1958 g.) 543 (1959) [hereinafter
Sbornik zakonov].
19. See Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR o premenenii smertnoi
kazni k izmennikam rodiny, shpionam, podryvnikam-diversantam [Decree of the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Application of the Death Penalty to
Traitors to the Motherland, Spies and Subversive Diversionists], reprinted in
Sbornik zakonov, supra note 18, at 544, translated in 3 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS
38 (1950) [hereinafter 1950 Restoration].
For an analysis of the different crimes .for which the death penalty was im-
posed from 1917 to 1970, including sentencing discretion, see Adams, supra note 4,
at 581-93.
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Leninist doctrine. Marx embodied the dichotomy between the
utopian socialist who opposed the death penalty and the practi-
cal revolutionary who endorsed terror for the purpose of secur-
ing the revolution. 2' Lenin also had no deep-seated opposition
to the death penalty. Although he and other prominent Rus-
sian revolutionaries are on record as having opposed it at the
1910 Copenhagen Congress of the Second International,21 in
retrospect this position seems to have been one of expediency.
His true attitude is revealed in the following quote attributed
to him by Trotskii, upon Lenin's learning of the second aboli-
tion of the death penalty in 1917: "Do you think you can settle
with your enemies if you disarm? What repressive measures do
you have then? Imprisonment? Who pays attention to that in a
time of bourgeois war... T2
The utopian socialist ideal, in which the state would with-
er away and the death penalty, like the criminal justice system
as a whole, would become superfluous,' faded before a lead-
ership determined to use any means to gain and retain power.
The frequent abolitions of the death penalty between 1917
and 1950 contrasted sharply with Soviet practice during this
period. Through a combination of nominal judicial proceedings,
extrajudicial executions, the subjection of prisoners to condi-
tions that ensured their death in incarceration, and govern-
mental policies causing death by famine, Lenin and Stalin
20. Adams, supra note 4,'at 578 (citing Marx's opposition to capital punish-
ment but endorsement of terror); see also 1 EDWARD H. CARR, A HISTORY OF
SOVIET RUSSIA: THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917-1923, at 155 (1950) (citing
Marx's endorsement of terror).
21. CARR, supra note 20, at 154 n.4.
22. LEON TROTSKY, LENIN 133 (1925); I. N. STEINBERG, IN THE WORKSHOP OF
THE REVOLUTION 144-45 (1953) (quoting same comment). See also Socialist Father-
land Decree, supra note 16, cited in PIPES, supra note 15, at 794.
23. See, e.g., Vladimir I. Lenin, Gosudarstvo i revoliutsiia [State and Revolu-
tion], in 33 POLNOE SOBRANIE SOCHINENII 1, 89 (5th ed. 1969), translated in 25
COLLECTED WORKS 387, 467 (4th ed. 1980) (advocating "use [of merciless force
toward the eventual goal of achieving a society in which there will be no need for
coercion"). See generally Gordon B. Smith, Development of "Socialist Legality" in
the Soviet Union, in 24 LAW IN EASTERN EUROPE: PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET LAW
FOR THE 1980S, at 77, 77-80 (F.J.M. Feldbrugge & William B. Simons eds., 1982).
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presided over the largest extermination of people in history.'
From its earliest days, the use of the death penalty in the
Soviet Union reflected a dual use of the criminal justice sys-
tem. On the one hand, the criminal justice system served com-
monly accepted goals of punishing and deterring acts that most
societies would find unacceptable and worthy of serious sanc-
tion. On the other hand, the criminal justice system served a
much broader purpose of political, economic, and social con-
trol.' The use of the death penalty to further the latter goal
was a hallmark of the Soviet system.
These dual purposes are evident in the first Soviet crimi-
nal code of 1922, which contained features that were to endure
in the Soviet criminal codes to come. The code was quite liber-
al in its treatment of many common crimes, reflecting the
aspirations of reformist legal scholars. The sentencing provi-
sions for incarceration, for example, were the most lenient in
Soviet history.2 Nevertheless, the code contained thirty-four
offenses for which the death penalty was available."
24. See ROBERT CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: STALIN'S PURGE OF THE THIR-
TIES 700-15 (rev. ed. 1973) (estimating 20 million deaths, including one million
"legal" executions during Stalin's reign); ROBERT CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: A
REASSESSMNT 485-86 (1990) (describing estimate of executions in The Great Ter-
ror as likely an underestimate); Vera Tolz, Ministry of Security Official Gives New
Figures for Stalin's Victims, RADIO FREE EURJRADIO LIBERTY, INC. RES. REP., May
1, 1992, at 8, 9 (citing new Russian estimates, supposedly based on KGB archives,
of 18 million "repressed" from 1935 to 1945, with 7 million of these executed);
PIPES, supra note 15, at 791-840 (describing the red terror). The number of vic-
tims of the red terror have not been estimated with as much accuracy as the
number of Stalin's victims. Pipes discredits the figure provided by Latsis, a Cheka
official, of 12,733 executions between 1918 and 1920 as far too low, and cites esti-
mates of scholars ranging from 50,000-140,000 victims. PIPES, supra note 15, at
838.
25. See Smith, supra note 23, at 82 (describing Vyshinskii's bifurcation of law
and politics, in which separate spheres of law were applied to anti-state acts and
all other acts).
26. The maximum sentence of incarceration under the code was 10 years. SU
RSFSR, Issue No. 15, Item No. 153 (1922) (codified at Ugolovnyi Kodeks RSFSR
[UK RSFSR], art. 33 (1922). See Peter H. Solomon, Soviet Penal Policy 1917-1934:
A Reinterpretation, 39 SLAVIC REV. 195, 204 (1980). Solomon persuasively argues
that the 1920s were a period of attempted reform in Soviet penal policy, despite
the influence of the secret police.
27. See UK RSFSR, arts. 58-66, 71, 75, 76, 81, 83, 86, 97, 106, 110-15, 131,
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The types of crimes that carried the death penalty reflect-
ed political concerns more than criminal justice concerns, with
crimes against the state being far more numerous than crimes
against the person.' There were eleven capital "counter-revo-
lutionary crimes," including: creating or participating in armed
counter-revolutionary groups; having contacts with foreign
governments for the purpose of armed interference in the Sovi-
et Union; participating in organizations whose goal was to
incite mass disorder in the population, the nonpayment of
taxes or the nonfulfillment of other obligations to the state;
interfering in the function of Soviet enterprises for counter-
180, 184, 202, 204, 206, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214 (1922).
The 1922 code was quickly amended to forbid the application of the death
penalty to minors and pregnant women. See Dekret Vserossiiskogo TSentral'nogo
Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta o dopolnenii st. 33 obshchei chasti ugolovnogo kodeksa
[Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on Additions to Article 33
of the General Part of the Criminal Code], SU RSFSR, Issue No. 47, Item No. 590
(1922) (minors); Postanovleniia IV sessii Vserossiiskogo TSentral'nogo
Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta IX Sozyva ob izmeneniiakh i dopolneniiakh ugolovnogo
kodeksa RSFSR [Resolution of the WIth Session of the All-Russian Central Exec-
utive Committee, IXth Meeting on Amendments and Additions to the Criminal
Code of the RSFSRI, SU RSFSR, Issue Nos. 72-73, Item No. 906 (1922) (minors
and pregnant women). The limitation as to pregnant women endured in Soviet
legislation. The limitation as to minors endured only until Stalin's reign of terror.
In 1935 a decree provided that children 12 and older would be punished as adults
for crimes such as theft, which carried the death penalty. ALEXANDER ORLOV, THE
SECRET HISTORY OF STALIN'S CRIMEs 52 (1953). The limitation reappeared in the
1962 code. See UK RSFSR, art. 23 (1962).
28. There are curious exceptions for robbery, see UK RSFSR, art 184 (1922),
and murder by military personnel. Postanovlenie TSentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo
Komiteta i Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov ob izmenenii st.st. 2 i 12 polozheniia o
voinskikh prestupleniiakh [Resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the
Council of People's Commissars on Amendments to Arts. 2 and 12 of the Statute
on Military Crimes], SU RSFSR, Issue No. 43, Item No. 206 (1934), crimes against
the person were not punishable by death under Soviet law until 1954, when mur-
der committed by civilians became punishable by death. See Ukaz Prezidiuma
Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ob usilenii ugolovnoi otvetstvennosti za umyshlennoe
ubiistvo [Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR On
Strengthening Criminal Responsibility for Intentional Murder], Vedomosti SSSR,
Issue No. 11, Item No. 221 (1954). This was followed by rape in 1962. See Ukaz
Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ob usilenii ugolovnoi otvetstvennosti za
iznasilovanie [Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on
Strengthening Criminal Responsibility for Rape], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 8,
Item No. 84 (1962).
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revolutionary purposes; and terrorism.' Economic crimes also
were punishable by death, for example, illegal trafficking in
goods under aggravating circumstances.' There was a long
list of capital crimes connected with the acts of government -
officials, such as: misusing power, bribe-taking or soliciting
bribes, and handing down unjust sentences.3 Finally, a num-
ber of military crimes or crimes committed in wartime were
also punishable by death.32 Crimes committed with the aid of
or for the purpose of aiding foreign countries were considered
particularly threatening to the young Soviet state, and were
frequently punishable by death.' Even the act of crossing
29. See UK RSFSR, arts. 57, 59, 62, 63, 64 (1922) (respectively).
30. See UK RSFSR, art. 97 (1922).
31. See UK RSFSR, arts. 106, 111, 114, 115 (1922) (respectively).
32. See, e.g., UK RSFSR, arts. 202, 204, 206 (1922) (failure to obey orders in
wartime, desertion during wartime, and avoiding service, respectively).
33. See, e.g., UK RSFSR, arts. 59, 61, 66 (1922); Polozhenie o prestupleniiakh
gosudarstvennykh (kontrrevoliutsionnykh i osobo dlia Soiuza SSR opasnykh
prestupleniiakh protiv poriadka upravleniia) [Resolution on Crimes Against the
State (Counter-revolutionary and Especially Dangerous Crimes Against the Govern-
ment Order of the USSR)], Item No. 4, Sobranie zakonov i rasporiazhenii raboche-
krestian'skogo pravitel'stva SSSR [SZ SSSR], Issue No. 12, Item No. 123 (1927)
[hereinafter 1927 Resolution] (codified at UK RSFSR, art. 58' (1927)) (rendering
assistance to the international bourgeoisie that is striving to overthrow the com-
munist system); 1950 Restoration, supra note 19 (restoring death penalty for trai-
tors and spies); UK RSFSR, art. 64 (1962) (treason, which included within its def-
inition aiding a foreign country in undertaking unfriendly acts against the USSR).
The fear of foreign enemies has a long pedigree that predates the revolution
and persists to this day, among respected intellectuals. See, e.g., ANDREI AMALRIK,
WILL THE SoviEr UNION SURVIVE UNTIL 1984?, at 44-62 (1970) (positing Chinese
invasion of Soviet Union in near future); ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, LErTER TO
THE SovIET LEADERS 13 (1974) (extending same Chinese invasion theory), and
extremist nationalists, see Celestine Bohlen, Rancor Grows in Russian Parliament,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1993, § 1, at 6; see also Harry Willets, The Wages of Eco-
nomic Sin, PROBLEMS OF COmmUNISM, Sept.-Oct. 1962, at 26, 30 (citing Soviet' of-
ficials who blame economic crime and other social ills on 'pernicious foreign influ-
ences'). It was reflected in various parts of the criminal code, such as the old
article 70, that increased the penalty for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda if
accomplished with the aid of foreign assistance. See Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo
Soveta RSFSR o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Ugolovnyi i Ugolovno-
protsessual'nyi kodeksy RSFSR [Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on
the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Criminal and Criminal Pro-
cedure Codes of the RSFSR], Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 5, Item No. 168 (1984).
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borders could bring the death penalty.'
The prominence of "state" crimes among capital offenses
is explained by Marxist-Leninist ideology, which regarded the
killing of enemies of the state as necessary for the victory of
Communism and the perpetuation of the dictatorship of the
proletariat (to say nothing of the personal dictatorship of
Soviet leaders). Crimes against the person, in contrast, were
an aberration caused by imperfect social conditions that
would improve with time.' Such criminals were regarded as
acting in response to social forces not within their control.
The definition of crimes against the state changed over
time, but the seriousness with which these crimes were re-
garded remained the same. Their existence and the severity
with which they were punished directly reflected the Soviet
ideology of pervasive state control in all spheres of life.
Lenin's red terror coincided with the civil war and his consol-
idation of power in its immediate aftermath. The relaxation
of state control of the "NEP" period corresponded to a de-
crease in the use of execution as an element of terror.'
34. UK RSFSR, art. 71 (1922) (returning into the RSFSR from exile);
Postanovleniie Prezidiuma TSentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta ob ob'iavlenii
vne zakona dolzbnostnykh lits-grazhdan Soiuza SSR za-granitsei, perebezhavshikh
v lager" vragov rabochego klassa i krest'ianstva i otkazyvaiushchikhaia
vernutsia v Soiuz SSR [Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive
Committee on Declaring as Illegal Official Citizens of the USSR Abroad, Having
Deserted to the Camp of the Enemies of the Working Class and Peasants and
Having Refused to Return to the USSR], SZ SSSR, Issue No. 76, Item No. 732
(1929) (defection); Zakon RSFSR o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenli v Ugolovnyi
kodeks RSFSR [Law of the RSFSR on the Introduction of Amendments and Addi-
tions to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR], Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 29, Item
No. 449 (1962) (treason, defined in part as "flight abroad or the refusal to return
to the USSR") (codified at UK RSFSR, art. 64 (1962)).
35. Lenin, supra note 23, at 91, translated at 469 ("ITihe root social reason
for excesses, which consist of violations of the rules of social life, is the exploita-
tion of the masses, their want and their poverty. With the removal of this chief
cause, excesses will inevitably begin to 'wither away'."); THE LAW OF THE SoviET
STATE 498 (Andrei Y. Vyshinsky ed. & Hugh W. Babb trans., 1948) (describing
'pillagers, thieves and hooligans" as criminals 'inherited from the capitalist social
order*).
36. The 1922 Criminal Code, with its numerous capital crimes, is a reflection
of post-Civil War anxiety. The number of executions was in fact far fewer than
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Stalin's absolutism was marked by an increase in the
number of capital crimes, with the addition of defection,'
some forms of theft of state property,' treason,' and vari-
ous military crimes. The definition of counter-revolutionary
crimes was also expanded under Stalin to include such vague
offenses as "rendering any kind of assistance whatever to the
international bourgeoisie," and "undermining government
industry." Stalin was also responsible for streamlining the
execution process, with a 1934 resolution that put strict time
limits on the investigation of "terrorist acts," mandated that
such cases be heard without the participation of the accused
in the process, forbade appeals, and mandated execution
immediately upon judgment.4'
during the terror.
37. See SZ SSSR, Issue No. 76, Item No. 732 (1929).
38. Postanovlenie TSentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta i Soveta
Narodnykh Komissarov ob okhrane imushchestva gosudarstvennykh predprniatii,
kolkhozov i kooperatsai i ukreplenii obshchestvennoi (sotsialisticheskoi)
sobstvennosti [Resolution of the Central Executive Committee and Council of
People's Commissars on the Protection of the Property of Government Enterprises,
Collective Farms and Cooperatives and the Strengthening of Society's (Socialist)
Property], SZ SSSR, Issue No. 62, Item No. 360 (1932).
39. Postanovlenie TSentral'nogo Ispelnitel'nogo Komiteta o dopolnenii
polozheniia o prestupleniakh gosudarstvennykh (kontrrevoliutsionnykh i osobo dlia
Soiuza SSR opasnykh prestupleniiakh protiv poriadka upravleniia) stat'iami ob
ismene rodine [Resolution of the Central Executive Committee On Additions to the
Statute on State Crimes (Counter-revolutionary and Especially Dangerous Crimes
Against the Government Order of the USSR) Articles on Treason], SZ SSSR, Issue
No. 33, Item No. 255 (1934).
40. See 1927 Resolution, eupra note 33, Item Nos. 4, 7. While Adams, aupra
note 4, at 587, suggests that the 1927 laws were more lenient in their call for the
death penalty, his analysis of the number of crimes and sentencing discretion does
not take into account the broader definition of offenses in the 1927 laws compared
to the 1922 laws. While he recognizes this limitation, he fails to acknowledge its
gravity. See Adams, 8upra note 4, at 586.
Another resolution passed just five months later greatly expanded the num-
ber of military crimes punishable by death. See Postanovlenie TSentral'nogo
Ipolnitel'nogo Komiteta i Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov o vvedenii v deistvie
polozhenia o voinskikh prestupleniiakh [Resolution of the Central Executive Com-
mittee and Council of People's Commissars, on the Entry into Force of the Regula-
tions on Military Crimes], SZ SSSR, Issue No. 50, Item No. 505 (1927).
41. Pbstanovlenie TSentral'nogo Ispelnitel'nogo Komiteta o vnesenii
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The existence of a broad category of "economic" crimes
and its punishment by death was another example of the use
of the criminal justice system in the Soviet Union for social
engineering and political ends. The death penalty for econom-
ic crimes appeared in the 1922 Code, disappeared briefly
between 1927 and 1932, reappeared during the height of the
Stalin terror,' disappeared again after the post-War aboli-
tion, and reemerged between 1961 and 1962."
izmenenii v deistvuiushchie ugolovno-protsessual'nye kodeksy soiuznykh reapublik
[Resolution of the Central Executive Committee On the Introduction of Amend-
ments to the Existing Criminal Procedure Code of the Union Republics], SZ SSSR,
Issue No. 64, Item No. 459 (1934).
42. See UK RSFSR, arts. 97, 114, 115, 180(z) (1922) (violating import-export
regulations, bribe-taking, provocation to bribe-taking, and large-scale theft of state
property, respectively). The death penalty was also available under the 1922 Crim-
inal Code for a variety of other non-violent crimes. See supra note 27.
43. Postanovlenie TSentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta i Soveta
Narodnykh Komissarov ob okhrane imushchestva gosudarstvennykh predpriiatii,
kolkhozov i kooperatsii i ukreplenii obshchestvennoi (sotsialisticheskoi)
sobstvennosti [Resolution of the Executive Committee and the Council of People's
Commissars On the Preservation of the Property of Government Enterprises, Col-
lective Farms and Cooperatives and the Strengthening of People's (Socialist) Prop-
erty], SZ SSSR, Issue No. 62, Item No. 360 (1932) (death penalty for theft of vehi-
cles of rail or water transport, collective farm and cooperative property). See also
Leon Lipson, Execution: Hallmark of Socialist Legality, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM,
Sept.-Oct. 1962, at 21, 22.
44. Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ob usilenii bor'by s osobo
opasnymi prestupleniiami [Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR On the Strengthening of the Fight Against Especially Dangerous Crimes],
Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 19, Item No. 207 (1961) (couiterfeiting, theft of gov-
ernment or society's property on an especially large scale) (codified at UK RSFSR,
arts. 88, 931 (1962) (counterfeiting and large scale theft, respectively)); Ukaz
Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ob usilenii ugolovnoi otvetstvennosti za
narushenie pravil o valiutnykh operatsiiakh [Decree of the Presidium of the Su-
preme Soviet of the USSR on Strengthening Criminal Responsibility for Violations
of the Rules on Hard Currency Transactions], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 27, Item
No. 291 (1961) (foreign currency transactions) (codified at UK RSFSR, art. 88
(1962)); Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ob usilenii ugolovnoi
otvetstvennosti za vziatochnichestvo [Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Sovi-
et of the USSR On the Strengthening of Criminal Responsibility for Bribe-taking],
Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 8, Item No. 85 (1962) (bribe-taking) (codified at UK
RSFSR, art. 173 (1962)); Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR o vnesenii
izmenenii i dopolnenii k stati 22 i 44 Osnov ugolovnogo zakonodatel'stva [De-
cree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the Introduction of
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At the same time that Khrushchev discredited Stalinist
terror,45 his use of the death penalty preserved the theoreti-
cal underpinnings that justified the terror, namely, that
crimes against the state could not be tolerated and deserved
the most severe punishment, even death. Under Khrushchev,
the definition of a crime against the state was modified to
focus on different behavior. The number of capital econom-
ic crimes grew and the popular media prominently reported
these sentences in a didactic fashion.47
Amendments and Additions to Articles 22 and 44 of the Fundamentals of Criminal
Legislation], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 14, Item No. 147 (1962), translated in 1
CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS 18 (1962) (decree incorporating above changes int6 Fun-
damentals of Criminal Legislation). See also Willetts, supra note 33, at 26 (de-
scribing new legislation).
45. See BEwfAM D. WOLFE, KHRUSHCHEV AND STALIN'S GHOST. TEXT, BACK-
GROUND AND MEANING OF KHRUSHCHEV'S SECREt REPORT TO THE TWENTIETH CON-
GRESS ON THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 24-25, 1956, at 88 (1957).
46. In the 1922 Code, crime was defined as "every socially dangerous action
or omission, threatening the basis of the soviet order and the system of rights,
established by the worker-peasant class for the period of time on the way to the
communist order.- UK RSFSR, Item No. 6. In 1962, crime was defined as 'socially
dangerous activities (actions or omissions) encroaching upon the soviet social or
government order, the socialist economic system, socialist property, the personality,
political, labor, property and other rights of the citizen, and equally other socially
dangerous activities encroaching on the socialist system of rights.* UK RSFSR,
Item No. 7 (1962) (emphasis added).
Compare also the articles discussing the purpose of the Criminal Code. Arti-
cle 8 of the 1922 Code states its purpose as 'the general deterrence of new viola-
tions on the part of the violator, as well as on the part of other unstable elements
of society; b) the adaptation of the offender to levels of social behavior by means
of the influence of labor; c) depriving the criminal of the opportunity to commit
further crimes Article 1 of the 1962 Code explains its purpose as 'the defense of
the [S]oviet social and governmental order, socialist property, personality and
rights of citizens and the entire socialist system of rights from criminal
enroachment." The protection of socialist property became a paramount goal.
47. See Willetts, supra note 33, at 27 (citing 15 Soviet newspaper reports be-
tween January and June of 1962 on death sentences handed down for economic
crimes).
Andrei Sakiarov dated the beginning of his involvement in the anti-death
penalty movement to a story that appeared in Nedelia in 1963 about an old man
who had counterfeited a few coins and hid them in his yard. The man was sen-
tenced to death after what Sakharov called a 'show trial,' with the press report-
ing his death sentence as being the result of ' 'numerous demands from working
people.' ANDREI SAKHAOV, MEMoIRS 238-39 (Richard Lourie trans., 1990).
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The main textbook for students of criminal law in the
1960s justified this change ideologically: as the Soviet state
moved from the perfection of "socialism" and closer to the
path of true "communism," the number of counter-revolution-
ary crimes perpetrated by capitalist or bourgeois elements in
society dropped sharply.' As one Soviet commentator put it,
"[tihe higher our society ascends toward the communist way
of life, the purer its morals, and the more intolerant it is of
everything that hampers and damages the people's work and
society's well-being."49
While Soviet society was supposedly moving closer to
communism, crimes like large-scale theft of socialist property
were still evident,' in fact, theft of socialist property
(whether large-scale or not) comprised the largest category of
crimes committed in the post-Stalin era.51 But it was not the
growth in the rate of economic crime that provided the only
impetus for the expansion of the death penalty in the 1960s.
As one Soviet official wrote, "it is not the number of such
crimes that has grown, but the immeasurable growth of the
irreconcilability of the Soviet people to elements that bring
disgrace on society and poison people's lives.""2 Despite
prominent reporting in the Soviet press of this period, it ap-
pears that the number of death penalty sentences for serious
economic crime was relatively small, accounting for less than
48. Vsesoiuznyi institut po izucheniiu prichin i razrabotke mer
preduprezhdeniia prestupnosti [All-Union Institute for the Study of Causes and
Means of Preventing Crime], SovErSKAIA KRIMINOLOGIIA [SoviEr CRIMINOLOGY] 73-
74 (1966) [hereinafter SoviEr CRIMNOLOGY].
49. Shakhnazarov, 0 kom pechet'sia 'taims' [About Whom is the -imes"
Concerned], IZVESTIA, May 14, 1961, at 4.
50. SoviEr CRIMINOLOGY, supra note 48, at 74.
51. SovIEr CRIMINOLOGY, supra note 48, at 75 (theft of socialist property ac-
counted for 20-25% of all crimes committed in the "contemporary" (circa 1966)
era).
52. Mironov, Ukreplenie sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti i pravoporiadka [The
Strengthening of Socialist Legality and Legal Process], PARTINAIA ZHIZN, Mar. 1962,
at 8, 13. The absence of accurate statistics makes it impossible to determine
whether or not theft of property had in fact increased.
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five percent of the death penalty convictions for this peri-
od.3 The disproportionate attention given the death penalty
for economic crimes was a powerful tool of social engineering,
designed to mold the behavior of the innocent as much as to
punish the guilty."
The intensified use of the death penalty under Khrush-
chev for economic crimes is evidence of a consistent pattern
in the Soviet criminal justice system: the search for new ene-
mies and the use of the criminal justice system to influence
political, social, and economic behavior. Under Lenin, the
enemies were the "white guards," the holdovers from the
imperial regime that sought to destroy socialism. Under Sta-
lin, the enemies were numerous and varied: the peasant who
dared to enrich himself,55 the soldier who wrote letters from
the front which were critical of Stalin, and even the guid-
ing lights of the Communist Party who supposedly strayed
from the true Stalinist path.57
Under Khrushchev, the scope of enemies subject to death
became narrower: those who undermined the economy of the
Soviet Union. Befitting their status as "crimes against the
state," the new economic capital crimes were prosecuted by
the Committee on State Security (KGB), rather than the
53. Gubarev, Povinnuiu golovu mech ne sechet? [Does Not the Sword Cut Off a
Guilty Head?], KOMSOMOL'SKAA PRAVDA, Feb. 26, 1991, at 1.
54. See Naumov, Ugolovnyi zakon v ueloviiakh perekhoda k rynochnoi
ekonomike [Criminal Law under Conditions of Transition to a Market Economy],
SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAvO [SoY. GOS. I PRAVO] Issue No. 2, 1991, at 28
('There exists to this day in Soviet criminal legislation, almost unprecedented in
world law-making practice, a collection of criminal law norms of every kind to
preserve the ideological purity of socialist economics.").
55. See LEONARD SCHAPIRO, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SoviET UNION 387
(2d rev. ed. 1971).
56. See, e.g., MICHAEL SCAMMELL, SOLZHENrSYN: A BIOGRAPHY 153 (1984) (de-
scribing arrest of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn).
57. See PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF JUSTICE OF THE U.S.S.R., REPORT OF
COURT PROCEEDINGS: THE CASE OF THE ANTI-SOVIT TROTSKYrrE CENTRE (1937)
(partial transcript of 1936 purge trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev, et al.) [hereinafter
TROTSKYIrE CENTRE].
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Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the procuracy, which
handled common crimes.'
II. CRmnNAL JUSICE REFORM UNDER GORBACHEV AND
YELTSIN
Khrushchev inadvertently began the process of destroy-
ing the legitimacy of the Soviet criminal justice system
through his revelation of Stalin's abuses in his famous secret
speech before the XXth Party Congress, 9 and through per-
mitting the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's descrip-
tion of life in a Stalinist labor camp, One Day in the Life of
Ivan Denisovich.' Solzhenitsyn's work, published only after
Khrushchev's personal approval,81 threw light for the first
time on the brutality of the labor camp system, a system that
abused political and common prisoners alike.
The Khrushchev "thaw" was limited to examination and
criticism of the Stalin era. No such latitude was permitted to
question the contemporary system of criminal justice. The
thaw also proved abortive. After Khrushchev's ouster in
1964, Leonid Brezhnev returned to a policy of repressing
criticism and other expression."2 Brezhnev and his succes-
sors, Iurii Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, continued to
use the criminal justice system for political ends.' The use
58. SAKHAROV, supra note 47, -at 239.
59. See WOLFE, supra note 45, at 88.
60. See Solzhenitsyn, Odin den' Ivana Denisovicha, Now MIR, Nov. 1962, at
8.,
61. For an account of Khrushchev's role in its publication, see ALEKSANDR I.
SOLZHENITSYN, THE OAK AND THE CALF: SKErCHE OF LITERARY LIFE IN THE SOVI-
ET UNION 4041 (Harry Willetts trans., 1980).
62. Soon after Khrushchev's ouster, Ivan Denisovich was literally cut out of
existing editions of Novy Mir. See DAVID REMNICK, LENIN'S TOMB: THE LAST DAYS
OF THE SOVIET EWp1IE 27 (1993).
63. The number of political prisoners in the Soviet Union was never known
with any certainty, and the number of confirmed cases could only serve as a base
from which to extrapolate even larger numbers. There were 848 confirmed political
prisoners in the USSR in 1982, 903 in 1983, 887 in 1984, and 837 in 1985. HEL-
SINKI WATCH, VIOLATIONS OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS: USSR 176 (1986) [hereinaf-
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of the death penalty during this period continued unabat-
ed."
It was only under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev
that the Soviet Union began truly to confront Lenin's and
Stalin's legacy and to reveal the moral squalor of the crimi-
nal justice system of the present day. This examination led
inevitably to a consideration of the role of the death penalty
in the criminal justice system and, eventually, to its curtail-
ment.
As with Khrushchev, Gorbachev's criminal-justice
"glasnost"' began with the revelation of Stalin's manipula-
tion of the criminal justice system. But as in Khrushchev's
time, the desire of the public for the truth outpaced the de-
sire of the leadership to permit its revelation.
In 1988 in Moscow a new non-governmental organization
called "Memorial" was founded, whose initial purpose was to
lay bare Stalin's crimes and construct a memorial and re-
search center in honor of the millions victimized during the
Stalin era. Vilified or passively resisted by many Soviet offi-
cials, including Gorbachev himself, but never fatally re-
pressed, Memorial became the vanguard of a broad-based
movement to acknowledge, publicize and seek redress for
Stalin's abuses.'
ter HELSINKI WATCH: VIOLATIONS OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS]. See generally AM.
NESY INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE USSR THEIR TREATMENT
AND CONDITIONS (1980) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CON-
SCIENCE].
64. See AmNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY 130-39 (1979) (report-
ing on use of the death penalty in the USSR in the mid-1970s). For the 1980s,
see Amnesty International's yearly country reports for that period.
65. An important component of the anti-Stalin campaign became advocacy of
monetary compensation and official rehabilitation for Stalin's victims. In time, the
government tried to offer a blanket rehabilitation, but advocates fought for a more
meaningful case-by-case rehabilitation. See Postanovlenie TSentral'nogo Komiteta
KPSS o dopolnitel'nykh merakh po vosstanovleniiu spravedlivosti v otnoshenii
zhertv repressii imeiushikh mesto v period 30-40-kh i nachala 50-kh godov [Res-
olution of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Additional Measures for the
Restoration of Justice in Regard to the Victims of Repression Having Taken Place
in the Period of the 1930s-40s and the beginning of the 1950s], PRAVDA, Jan. 6,
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The literature of repression, previously known only
through underground distribution of works such as
Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago, burst aboveground and
into the mainstream Soviet press.' Hardly a day could go
by without an account of Stalin's abuses appearing in a ma-
jor circulation newspaper or journal.
In 1990, after successfully overcoming official reluctance,
Memorial's monument honoring the victims of Stalin was
dedicated. The inscription on the monument was a portent of
the struggle that was to continue: while conservatives in the
Soviet government sought to confine the monument to vic-
tims of "Stalinism," its more radical proponents saw it as a
memorial to victims of "repression," repression which contin-
ued beyond Stalin and to the present day. 7
The fight over a monument to victims of repression was
an important symbol in a larger struggle to create a society
of laws and justice out of a long history of totalitarianism.
Gorbachev and the scholars who flourished under him popu-
1989, at 1 (providing for rehabilitation of those persecuted between 1930 and
1953); Zakon RSFSR o reabilitatsii zhertv politicheskikh repressii [Law of the
RSFSR on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression], Vedomosti RSFSR,
Issue No. 44, Item No. 1428 (1991) (providing for rehabilitation of those persecuted
throughout the history of the Soviet Union); Ukaz Prezidenta Soiuza SSSR o
vosstanovlenii pray vsekh zhertv politichesklkh repressii 20-50-kh godov, [Decree of
the President of the USSR on the Restoration of Rights of All Victims of Political
Repression Conducted in the 1920s-50s], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 34, Item No.
647 (1990).
66. Gulag Archipelago was serialized in Novy Mir, the same journal that first
published One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. See Aleksandr I. Solzheniteyn,
Arkhipelag Gulag, Novy MIm, Aug. 1989, at 7. See also, e.g., Alexander Akulichev
& Alexai Pamyatnykh, Katyn: Confirm or Refute, MoSCow NEWS, May 28, 1989, at
16 (describing Soviet execution of 25,700 Polish officers and prisoners of war at
the end of World War II); David Remnick, Memoir of a Gulag Witness: Lev
Rozgon's Newly Published Vignettes from the Stalin Era, WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
1990, at D1 (describing publication of Gulag memoirs in Soviet press).
67. Similarly, Soviet officials could not prevent the critique of Stalin from
tainting Lenin and hence the roots of the Soviet state. See Tolz, supra note 24, at
8 (noting rehabilitation under Khrushchev concerned only the period between 1934
and 1953, the first rehabilitation under Gorbachev concerned 1930 to 1953, the
second concerned the 1920s through the 1950s, and only after the breakup of the
Soviet Union did rehabilitation in Russia cover 1917 through 1991).
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larized the concept of a "rule of law" state,s and human
rights activists, legal scholars, and politicians fought to make
the concept a reality, in terms that were more radical than
Gorbachev himself conceived.
The legal reform movement began by recognizing and
publicizing the serious deficiencies in the Soviet justice sys-
tem, past and present. The widespread use of the death
penalty was just one of these. Others included: an all-power-
68. See, eg., Mikhail Gorbachev, Sotsialisticheskaia ideia i revoliutsionnaia
perestroika [The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Restructuring], PRAVDA, Nov. 26,
1989, at 1, 2 (advocating separation of powers and independent judiciary).
69. The following discussion is limited to the criminal justice sphere, although
many of the deficiencies affected the civil sphere as well.
Civil justice reform was less controversial and more successful (at least on
paper) than criminal justice reform, with a host of legislation being passed on the
All-Union level purporting to guarantee civil liberties. See, e.g., Zakon Soiuza
Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik o poriadke obzhalovaniia v sud
nepravomernykh deistvii dolzhnostnykh lits, ushcheinliaiushchikh prava grazhdan
[Law of the USSR On the Procedure for Appealing to a Court about the Illegal
Acts of Officials, Infringing on the Rights of Citizens], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No.
26, Item No. 388 (1987); Zakon SSSR o Svobode sovesti i religioznykh
organizatsiiakh [Law of the USSR On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Orga-
nizations], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 41, Item No. 813 (1990), translated in HEL-
sINKI WATCH, GLASTNOST IN JEOPARDY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR 147 (1991)
[ereinafter HELSINKI WATCHZ HUMAN RiGHTS IN THE USSR]; Zakon SSSR ob
obshchestvennykh obedineniiakh [Law on Public Organizations], Vedomosti SSSR,
Issue No. 42, Item No. 839 (1990), translated in HElSINKI WATCH: HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE USSR, supra, at 141. Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR o
poriadke organizatsii i provedeniia sobranii, mitingov, ulichnykh shestvii i
demonstratsii v SSSR [Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR On the Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Meetings, Rallies, Street
Marches, and Demonstrations in the USSR], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 31, Item
No. 504 (1988), translated in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE-SOVIEr
UNION [FBIS-SOV], July 29, 1988, at 40; Zakon SSSR o pechati i drugikh
sredstvakh massovoi informatsii [Law of the USSR on the Press and Other Forms
of Mass Media], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 26, Item No. 492 (1990), translated in
HElSINKI WATHm HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR, supra, at 123; Zakon SSSR o
poriadke vyezda iz Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i v~ezda v
Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialistichesldkh Respublik grazhdan SSSR [Law of the USSR
On the Procedure for Exit from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Entry
into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by Citizens of the USSR], Vedomosti
SSSR, Issue No. 24, Item No. 687 (1991).
The Russian government retained many of these laws and subsequently
passed many of its own.
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ful procuracy and a compliant judiciary which ensured that
the overriding goal of the criminal justice system was to pro-
cure convictions;7' poorly trained judges and lawyers, mak-
ing the power of the procuracy unchecked; inadequate legal
guarantees for the rights of defendants, including the right to
defense counsel and the right to be apprised of the charges
and evidence against one; a criminal code that punished ac-
tivity guaranteed by international human rights instru-
ments;7 ' an ideologically biased code that treated crimes
70. See Kontseptsiia ugolovnogo zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoi Federatoii [Frame-
work of Criminal Legislation of the Russian Federation] [hereinafter Framework of
Criminal Legislation], in Razrabotka nouogo ugolounogo i ugolouno-
protsessual'nogo zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Elaboration of New Crim-
inal and Criminal Procedure Legislation of the Russian Federation] 8 GOSUDARSTVO
I PRAVO [GOS. I PRAVO] Issue No. 8, 1992, at 38, 40 (noting that the procuracy
and MVD viewed the criminal statutes as "utilitarian" and sought through amend-
ments to create the illusion that they were fulfilling Party directives and waging a
decisive war on crime) [hereinafter Razrabotka]; Kontseptsiia ugolovno-
protsessual'nogo zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Framework of Criminal
Procedure Legislation of the Russian Federation] [hereinafter Framework of Proce-
dure], in Razrabotka, supra, at 46, 46 ("in reality not only the investigator and
the procurator, but to a significant extent the court as well fulfills the function of
accusation'); G. KHOKHRIAKOV, PARADOKSY TIR'MY [THE PARADoxES OF PRISON]
173-75 (1991) (noting the lack of due process resulting from the fact that the mili-
tia, the procuracy, the investigator and the court are all charged exclusively with
the mandate to fight crime).
The Frameworks of Criminal Legislation and Procedure are hortatory guide-
lines for developing new criminal laws that were "adopted" by vote of the Con-
gress of People's Deputies. The Congress also adopted a Framework of Judicial
Reform. See IAWYEPs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL
REFORM IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 29-35 (1993) (describing framework of judicial
reform).
71. See, e.g., UK RSFSR, art. 70 (anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda) and
art. 190-1 (anti-Soviet slander) (used to punish any criticism of the government or
life in the Soviet Union); art. 79 (mass disorders) and art. 190-3 (participation in
group actions that disturb the peace) (used to punish peaceful assembly and peti-
tioning); art. 83 (illegal entry to or exit from the USSR) and art. 64 (treason,
which included fleeing the USSR) (used to curtail freedom of movement); art. 142
(infringement of laws on separation of church and state and church and school)
and art. 227 (infringement of the rights of citizens in the guise of performing reli-
gious rites) (used to curtail freedom of religion); and, art. 209 (parasitism) (used to
punish dissidents for failure to have officially sanctioned employment) (1987).
In addition to these code items, which on their face were overbroad, vague,
or designed purposely to punish activity protected by international human rights
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against the state as more serious than crimes against the
person; excessive reliance on an inhumane correctional
system;7 the use of psychiatry in the criminal justice sys-
tem as a tool to punish dissent;'74 and a practice of flouting
the few procedural safeguards that existed. 5 In all these
areas, the USSR was recognized as failing to live up to inter-
national standards as established by international law and
instruments, there were as many articles of the criminal code which, while appear-
ing to punish activity recognized by the international community as criminal, were
in fact used predominantly or frequently to punish dissent See, e.g., UK RSFSR,
art. 193 (threats or force against an official) (used to punish peaceful challenges to
official action); art. 88 (violation of currency regulations) (used against dissidents,
who, prevented from working in the USSR, were compelled to live on donations of
hard currency from abroad); art. 218 (illegal possession, production or sale of
weapons) and art. 224 (illegal possession, production or sale of narcotics) (weapons
and drugs were planted on those the government wished to punish); art. 188 (ma-
liciously disobeying the demands of labor colony administrators) (used to extend
term of dissidents due to be released) (1987). Most of the criminal code articles
mentioned in this footnote are similar to those found in Harold Berman's English
translation of the 1965 Code. SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR
CODES (Harold J. Berman & James W. Spindler trans. & eds., 2d ed. 1972).
Even after the facially objectionable articles listed above were abolished or
fell into disuse, the misuse of those in this second category continued. For exam-
ple, in 1991, a group of retired military personnel belonging to the activist group
Shchit' who had been investigating the use of force by Soviet troops in Vilnius,
Lithuania in January, 1991, were arrested and charged with illegal possession of
weapons, narcotics and gold. The accused described the charges as fabricated, and
the charges were eventually dropped. Interview with Evgenii Evstigneev, one of
the arrestees, Moscow, Russia (Mar. 1991).
72. Framework of Criminal Legislation, supra note 70, at 40.
73. See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, supra
note 63. See also Framework of Criminal Legislation, supra note 70, at 40 n.2
(noting the sharp increase in the availability of deprivation of freedom as a pun-
ishment in the 1960 code compared to the 1926 code).
74. See, eg., KORYAGIN, A MAN STRUGGUNG FOR HUmAN DIGNITY (I. van
Voren ed., 1987) (describing work of psychiatrist and political prisoner Anatolii
Koriagin to expose abuses of Soviet psychiatry).
75. See Framework of Procedure, supra note 70, at 47 (noting the failure of
Soviet judicial process to fulfill even those modest principles it established for
itself).
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municipal practice.' Most of these deficiencies persist to
this day.
The Russian criminal justice system has relied to a great
extent on confessions as the main source of evidence."
Criminal trials are in many cases more similar to an Ameri-
can sentencing hearing after plea bargaining than an impar-
tial examination of the evidence and a determination of
guilt-the defendant admits his guilt, and his attorney ar-
gues to the judge for mitigation of punishment. The convic-
tion rate in Russia is one of the highest in the world, esti-
mated at around ninety-nine percent." The reason for the
high conviction rate has less to do with the skill of the militia
and procuracy in finding the guilty party than with the pres-
sure to maintain such high statistics.'
76. See Framework of Criminal Litigation, supra note 70, at 41, 43 (pointing
out deficiencies in the old code compared to international law and practice and
noting the necessity of a new criminal code to conform to the 'norms of humane
civilization and international agreements"). Cf. Golik, Prestupnost' v SSSR:
Problemy starye i novye [Crime in the USSR- Old and New Problems], SoV. GOs. I
PRAVO, Issue No. 2, 1991, at 20, 26 (criminal legal reforms motivated by desire to
comply with international agreements).
The Soviet Union deposited instruments of ratification to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1973. It was also a Party to the Helsin-
ki Final Act and subsequent agreements of the Commission on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe. Russia succeeded to these international instruments upon the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
77. The roots of this practice can be traced to the work of Stalin's Procurator
General and chief engineer of the purges, Andrei Vyshinskii, who relied almost
exclusively on coerced and false confessions in the trials of Bukharin, Piatakov,
Kamenev, Radek, and others. BERMAN, supra note 6, at 70-71; John N. Hazard,
Where are the Peril Points, 15 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 521, 522 (1990). See
TROTSKYITE CENTRE, supra note 57.
78. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 14.
79. See Louise L, Shelley, Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Con-
trol, 15 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 479, 517 (1990) (noting that Communist Party once
required police to "clear 95% of all crimes"); KHOKHRIAKOV, supra note 70, at 173-
74 ('demand for positive results" causes 'militia to 'hide' statistics, that is, to not
register the facts of crimes known to them, and the procurator ... closes its
eyes"); Ger P. Van den Berg, Judicial Statistics in a Period of Glasnost, 13 REV.
OF SOCIALIST L. 299, 311 (1987) (analyzing statistics from 1970 to 1986 and con-
cluding that statistics are generally manipulated to "show the effects of the policy
of the new leadership"). It is easy to infer that vigorous prosecution of the inno-
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Criminal justice critics of the Gorbachev era faulted the
system not just for punishing the innocent, but also for mis-
treating the guilty. When the human rights movement
emerged above ground, it demonstrated that the injustice of
this system was not limited to punishing dissident intellectu-
als. Former dissidents who had spent years as subjects in the
criminal justice system and in the penal systems° lived and
worked side by side with real criminals who, like the
politicals, also suffered unjustly at the hands of the state!'
A component of the new legal reform/human rights move-
ment was therefore a prisoner rights movement that advocat-
ed penal reform. 2
The second stage in the legal reform movement was the
implementation of reforms through changes in practice and
through promulgation of new legal safeguards. Changes in
practice tended to occur first. For example, the use of two of
cent occurs for the same reasons just cited.
Recent news reports suggest that the obsession with statistics as a mea-
surement of the efficacy of law enforcement continues to this day. See, e.g., The
Wild and the ?Jew Criminality," 48 NEDELA 7 (1992), translated in FBIS-USR,
Jan. 27, 1993, at 33 (interview with Russian Procurator General Stepankov in
which he notes that in the first half of 1992, '47,000 procuratorial checkups were
conducted, in the course of which more than 29,000 illegal juridical acts were un-
covered .... This exceeds by many times the number of violations uncovered by
all the control organs taken together (of which, by the way, there are almost 10
times more than procuracy employees).").
80. For example, Andrei Sakharov (seven years in internal exile), became a
deputy in the newly created Congress and was the leading congressional
spokesperson for human rights. Sergei Kovalev (seven years in prison and labor
camp, three years in internal exile) became, and is currently, the Chairman of the
Human Rights Committee of the Russian Parliament. Valerii Abramkin (six years
in labor camps and prisons for his human rights activity) began the 'Sodeistvie
organization, whose goal is the reform of the criminal justice system and, in par-
ticular, the prison system.
81. Cf. Comments on a Draft Russian Criminal Code by VS. Ustinov, GOs. I
PRAVO, Issue No. 6, 1992, at 87 (characterizing the present criminal code in prac-
tice as 'one of the most cruel pieces of legislation in the civilized world").
82. See infra text accompanying notes 133-37. The work of Valerii Abramkins
Prison Project and Marina Rumshiskaia's work on behalf of prisoner rights at
Memorial are particularly noteworthy. Other organizations, such as Gummanost
in Petersburg, have also addressed the treatment of prisoners.
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the most notorious "political" articles of the criminal code,
articles 190-1 and 70, decreased markedly beginning in
1987.' The number of political prisoners entering the sys-
tem slowed, and at the same time, the number being released
increased.'
Such practical changes have been motivated as much by
external pressure from foreign and domestic human rights
groups and foreign governments as by a genuine governmen-
tal commitment to reform.' At various times, influential
members of the criminal justice establishment have passively
or actively obstructed criminal justice reform.' While the
leadership of the MVD has supported some reform efforts,
the procuracy, which stands to lose the most from any redis-
tribution of authority in the criminal justice system, has been
a serious obstacle to reform, as has the state security appara-
83. HELsnNKI WATCH, TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW. SovIEr LEGAL REFORM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER PERESTRoA 116 (1989).
84. In 1985, the year Gorbachev became head of the Communist Party, the
number of confirmed cases stood at 837. HELSINKI WATCm- VIOLATIONS OF THE
HEsINKI ACCORDS, supra note 63, at 175-76. By the end of his tenure and the
dissolution of the USSR in the fall of 1991, this number had decreased to approxi-
mately 91 (including 54 prisoners in Georgia). VEsTI IZ SSSR [USSR NEWS BRIEF],
Oct. 30, 1991.
85. See LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 70, at 16 (citing
KGB memo noting that political prisoners were freed to create appearance of hu-
man rights protection). The resolution of political prisoner cases was one of the
main goals of U.S. human rights policy toward the Soviet Union. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATcH, WORLD REPORT 1990, at 398 (1991).
86. In 1988, for example, the author met with then Chairman of the Moscow
College of Advocates (at the time the rough equivalent of a bar association),
Georgii Alekseevich Voskresenskii, who denied the existence of political prisoners
and the "dopusk" system whereby political cases could only be defended by attor-
neys screened and approved by the KGB. Voskresenskii was also one of a minority
of members of the Collegium that voted in 1988 against the readmission to the
bar of Boris Zolotukhin, who had been disbarred in 1968 for defending Aleksandr
Ginzburg in a political trial. In 1990 the Chairman of the Russian Supreme Court,
Viacheslav Lebedev, made similar misrepresentations in a meeting with the au-
thor. The 'dopusk system" is reported still to exist, with prosecutors unsuccessfully
attempting to dictate choice of counsel to some of those accused in the August
1991 coup attempt. See Valerii Rudnev, Today Lawyers Also Need Protection,
IZVESTIIA, Apr. 16, 1992, at 3, translated in FBIS-USR, Apr. 29, 1992, at 42.
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tus. Reformist legislators have had to fight a political opposi-
tion that represents both the authoritarianism of the recent
Soviet pasts7 and the public fear of increasing crime and
social chaos.' Despite the new-found voice of the human
rights movement, these forces remain powerful barriers.
Nevertheless, significant changes have occurred in legis-
lation, even if effective implementation has proven problem-
atic. A limitation on pretrial detention was passed in 1989.
The right to counsel was enshrined in 1990 in the USSR and
in 1992 in the Russian Federation.' In 1992 amendments to
87. The RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies was selected from a slate of
candidates, 75% of whom were nominated by Communist Party labor collectives.
Eighty-six percent of the elected deputies were Communist Party members. LAW-
YE:RS COmmITr FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 70, at 45. One analyst of Rus-
sian affairs estimates that the current Russian Supreme Soviet, which is elected
by and from the Congress of People's Deputies, consists of 10-15% reformers who
support President Yeltsin, 15-20% hard line conservatives-most former Commu-
nists or extreme nationalists-with the remainder filling out a spectrum that is
tilted toward the conservatives. Interview with Dmitri Simes, Russian Politics (C-
Span 2 television, cablecast Jan. 28, 1993).
88. See Gerasimov, Socioogiste Offer Evidence: Fate is Criminal, Life is
Cheap-What Could Free Weapons Sales Lead to?, PRAVDA, Oct. 15, 1992, at 4,
translated in FBIS-USR, Oct. 24, 1992, at 5 (reporting on popular concern for per-
sonal safety;, citing poll in which majority of Moscow residents express desire to
carry weapon for self-defense). See also infra note 150 (citing crime statistics).
89. See Zakon SSSR o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v stat'iu 34 Osnov
ugolovnogo sudoproizvodstva Soiuza SSR i soiuznykh respublik [Law of the USSR
on the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Article 34 of the Fundamen-
tals of Procedure of the USSR and Union Republics], Item No. 1, Vedomosti SSSE,
Issue No. 25, Item No. 493 (1989). The 'maximum" term was limited to two
months, but with the approval of the procuracy could be extended to up to one
and one-half years. In practice, the author found that the law was routinely violat-
ed.
90. See Zakon SSSR o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Osnovy ugolovnogo
sudoproizvodstva Soiuza SSR i soiuznykh respublik [Law of the USSR on the In-
troduction of Amendments and Additions to the Fundamentals of Procedure of the
USSR and Union Republics], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 16, Item No. 272 (1990);
Zakon Rossiskoi Federatsii o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v ugolovno-
protsessual'nyi kodeks RSFSR [Law of the Russian Federation on the Introduc-
tion of Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code], art. I
(5-7), Vedomosti S'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiskoi Federatsii i verkhovnogo
soveta Ressiskoi Federatsii [Vedomosti RF], Issue No. 25, Item No. 1389 (1992),
translated in FBIS-USR, Aug. 5, 1992, at 1 (amending articles 47, 49 and 51 of
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the Russian criminal procedure code gave detainees the right
to a court review of the legality of detention.9' The long-
awaited introduction of the jury system was announced for
1993, to begin on an experimental basis in five areas in Rus-
sia.'
Reforms to the substantive criminal code were also im-
plemented: articles 190-1 and 70 were replaced, not without
some backsliding, to cover a narrower range of incitement to
violence.' "Parasitism," entrepreneurial activity, religious
activity, the violation of passport rules, consensual sex be-
tween men, and other acts were decriminalized.' The crimi-
Criminal Procedure Code).
To this day, the right to counsel continues to be of limited value since
there is no requirement that detainees be advised of the right, and there is no
provision for punishing violations, for example by an exclusionary rule for confes-
sions obtained in the absence of counsel. Many criminal defendants interviewed by
the author have described the function of their attorneys as limited to pleading
with the court for mitigation of their sentences.
91. See Zakon Rossiskoi Federatsii o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v
Ugolovno-protsessual'nyi kodeks RSFSR [Law of the Russian Federation on the
Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Procedure Code of the
RSFSR], Item No. I (1 & 18), Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 25, Item No. 1389 (1992),
traslated in FBIS-USR, Aug. 5, 1992, at 1, 3.4 (amending Criminal Procedure
Code article 11 and adding articles 220.1 & 220.2).
92. Valerii Rudnev, Trial by Jury is Returning to Russia, IZVESTIIA, Nov. 27,
1992, at 3, translated in FBIS-USR, Dec. 30, 1992, at 24.
93. See Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR o vnesenil izmenenii i
dopolnenii v Zakon SSSR 'Ob ugolovnoi otvetstvennosti za gosudarstvennye
prestupleniia' i nekotorye drugie zakonodatel'nye akty SSSR [Decree on the In-
troduction of Amendments and Additions to the 'Law of the USSR on Criminal
Responsibility for State Crimes" and Several Other Legislative Acts of the USSR],
Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 15, Item No. 106 (1989) [hereinafter Decree]; Zakon
SSSR ob utverzhdenii Ukaza Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ot 8 aprelia
1989 goda '0 vnezenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Zakon SSSR 'Ob ugolovnoi
otvetstvennosti za gosudarstvennye prestupleniia' i nekotorye drugie
zakonodatel'nye akty SSSR," [Law of the USSR on Affirming the Decree of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 8, 1989 "On the Introduc-
tion of Amendments and Additions to the 7Law of the USSR on Criminal Responsi-
bility for State Crimes' and Several Other Legislative Acts of the USSR"],
Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 9, Item No. 203 (1989) (affirming the decree).
94. See, eg., Zakon RSFSR o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolenenii v Ugolovnyi
kodeks RSFSR, Ugolovno-protsessualnyi kodeks RSFSR i Kodeks RSFSR ob
administrativnykh pravonarusheniakh [Law of the RSFSR on the Introduction of
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nal code was also amended to punish the use of the criminal
justice system to violate individual rights.'
Even before the ink was dry on many of these reforms,
however, other laws were passed in the criminal sphere that
represented a step backward in the protection of human
rights and civil liberties: a new code provision punished slan-
dering the President,9 and another punished incitement of
Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, the Criminal
Procedure Code of the RSFSR and the Code of the RSFSR on Administrative Vio-
lations], Item No. 11, Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 52, Item No. 1867 (1991);
ROSSnSKAIA GAZETA, May 27, 1993 (decriminalization of homosexuality).
95. See, e.g., Polozheniie ob usloviiakh i poriadke okazaniia psikhiatricheskoi
pomoshchi [Regulations on the Conditions and Procedures for Rendering Psychiat-
ric Care], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 2, Item No. 19 (1988) (providing for criminal
penalties for those who confine healthy people in psychiatric hospitals); Ukaz
Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR o vnesenenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v
Ugolovnyi i Ugolovno-protsessualnyi kodeksy RSFSR [Decree of the Presidium of
the RSFSR on the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Criminal and
Criminal Procedure Codes of the RSFSR], Item No. 2, Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue
No. 2, Item No. 35 (1988) (placement of a person not known to be mentally ill in
a psychiatric hospital") (codified at UK RSFSR, art. 1262 (1990)); Ukaz Prezidiuma
Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Ugolovnyi kodeks
RSFSR [Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on the In-
troduction of Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR]
Item No. 2, Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 45, Item No. 1572 (1985) ("intentional in-
fringement by an official of the rights ... of a citizen, associated with his perse-
cution for submission of proposals, petitions or complaints in accordance with the
established procedure*) (codified at UK RSFSR, art. 139' (1990)); Ukaz Prezidiuma
Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Ugolovnyi kodeks
RSFSR i Kodeks RSFSR ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniiakh [Decree of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on the Introduction of Amend-
ments and Additions to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the Code of the
RSFSR on Administrative Violations], art. I (1), Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 50,
Item No. 1477 (1989) (interference in criminal cases) (codified at UK RSFSR, art.
1761 (1990)).
96. See Zakon SSSR o zashchite chesti i dostoinstva Prezidenta SSSR [Law of
the USSR on the Protection of the Honor and Dignity of the President of the
USSR], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 22, Item No. 391 (1990); Postanovlenie
Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR o poriadke primeneniia i vvedeniia v deistvie Zakona
SSSR '0 zashchite chesti i dostoinstva Prezidenta SSSR" [Resolution of the Su-
preme Soviet of the USSR on the Entry into Force of the Law of the USSR 'On
the Protection of the Honor and Dignity of the President of the USSR"], Vedomosti
SSSR, Issue No. 22, Item No. 392 (1990). This provision was not codified in the
1990 RSFSR Code.
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ethnic hatred,' which was used in some parts of the Soviet
Union as a pretext to punish political opponents of the Com-
munist regime.' A Presidential decree and subsequent law
expanded the power of the militia to conduct searches.' A
law on the state security apparatus has enshrined its author-
ity to conduct warrantless searches and monitor phone con-
versations and mail, without adequate protections against
abuse of these sweeping powers,"° while a subsequent law
has provided only procuratorial, not judicial, oversight of
such activities.' 1
The failed coup in August 1991 gave reformers a short-
lived political opportunity to pass more comprehensive re-
forms. On September 5, 1991, the USSR Congress of People's
Deputies passed the Declaration of Human Rights and Free-
97. Decree, aupra note 93.
98. See HEISlNKI WATCH, CONFLICT IN THE SOVIET UNION: BLACK JANUARY IN
AZERWAAN 33 (1991) (incitement of ethnic hatred used to imprison Etibar
Mamedov and other opponents of Communist regime in Azerbaijan in 1990).
99. See Ukaz Preziduma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ob obiazannostiakh i
pravakh vnutrennikh voisk Ministerstva vnutrennikh del SSSR pri okbrane
obshchestvennogo poriadka [Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR on the Responsibilities and Rights of Internal Troops of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of the USSR while Preserving Public Order], Vedomosti SSSR,
Issue No. 31, Item No. 505 (1988) (decree accompanying law on demonstrations,
supra note 71, that authorized entering houses in hot pursuit or for the preven-
tion of crimes threatening public order or personal safety); Zakon SSSR ob
obiazannostiakh i pravakh vnutrennikh voisk Ministerstva vnutrennikh del SSSR
pri okhrane obshchestvennogo poriadka [Law of the USSR on Responsibilities and
Rights of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Con-
cerned with Protecting Public Order], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 14, Item No. 233
(1990), trarslated in FBIS-SOV., Apr. 2, 1990, at 39 (authorizing MV! troops to
enter nonresidential buildings without a warrant 'in pursuit of persons suspected
of committing crimes" and to enter residences without a warrant in order 'actually
to stop crimes").
100. See Zakon SSSR ob organakh gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti v SSSR [Law
of the USSR on State Security Organs in the USSR], art. 14 (3) & (9), Vedomosti
SSSR, Issue No. 22, Item No. 630 (1991), translated in FBIS-SOV, May 28, 1991,
at 35.
101. See Zakon Rossiskoi Federatsii ob operativno-rozynskoi deiatel'nosti v
Rossiskoi Federatsii [Law of the Russian Federation on Operational-Investigative
Activities in the Russian Federation], art. 8, Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 17, Item No.
892 (1992).
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doms (Declaration) as a precursor to guarantees of human
rights and civil liberties to be contained in a new USSR Con-
stitution."° In the criminal justice sphere, the Declaration
contained guarantees of equal protection0 3  and due
process,"° a prohibition of torture or cruel and inhumane
treatment,"° protections against unlawful search and sei-
zure,"° and a prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation
of life.107
The Declaration was short-lived, as the Soviet Union dis-
solved just four months later. Shortly before dissolution, on
November 27, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Fed-
eration passed an even more ambitious Declaration of Rights
and Freedoms (Russian Declaration). The Russian Decla-
ration contains guarantees of equal protection,' 9 the pre-
sumption of innocence in criminal proceedings," the right
to habeas corpus,"' the right to counsel," protections
against double jeopardy" 3 and warrantless search and sei-
zure,"' and an exclusionary rule."5 The Russian Declara-
102. See Deklaratsiia pray i svobod cheloveka [Declaration of Human Rights
and Freedoms], Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 37, Item No. 1083 (1991), translated in
Soviet Turmoil: Text of Rights Adopted by the Soviet Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept
7, 1991, § 1, at 5.
103. Id. art 3.
104. Id. arts. 15 & 16.
105. Id. art. 17.
106. Id. arts. 18 & 19.
107. Id. art. 13.
108. Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR o deklaratsii pray i svobod
cheloveka i grazhdanina [Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on the
Declaration of Rights and Freedoms of People and Citizens], Vedomosti RSFSR,
Issue No. 52, Item No. 1865 (1991), translated in FBIS-USR, Jan. 7, 1991, at 48
[hereinafter RSFSR Declaration].
109. Id. art. 3.
110. Id. art. 34.
111. Id. Item No. 8.
112. Id. Item No. 37.
113. Id. art. 34.
114. Id. art. 9 & 11.
115. Id. art. 34.
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tion also contains an article stating Russia's aspiration to
abolish the death penalty.116 Despite this seemingly broad
protection, the Declaration is generally not considered to be
self-executing and hence of limited practical value.
The Russian Constitution was also amended in 1991 and
1992 to include similar human rights provisions:"' an equal
protection clause,"8 a prohibition of torture and cruel and
unusual punishment,"9 protections against unlawful search
and seizure," and a prohibition against the arbitrary de-
privation of life that limited the application of the death pen-
alty.'" The Constitution also added a right against self-in-
crimination and the prohibition of ex post facto laws." Fi-
nally, primacy was granted to international human rights
instruments with an effort to make them self-executing.
1
These protections suffer from two serious drawbacks. The
first is that many are subject to subsequent limitation in
accordance with Russian law." Second, and more impor-
tant, the Constitution was treated throughout Soviet history
116. Id. art. 7. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
117. See Zakon Rossiskoi Federatsii ob izmeneniiakh i dopolneniiakh
Konstitutsii (osnovogo zakona) Rossiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi
Respubliki [Law of the Russian Federation on Amendments and Additions to the
Constitution (Basic Law) of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], part
5, Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 20, Item No. 1084 (1992) [hereinafter Amendments to
the Constitution].
118. 1& art. 34.
119. 1& art. 39. In contrast to the Constitution, the Declaration contained an
additional clause guaranteeing a right to humane treatment and dignity in prison.
RSFSR Declaration, supra note 108, art. 17.
120. Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 117, arts. 40 & 41.
121. Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 117, art. 38. See infra note
178 and accompanying text.
122. Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 117, arts. 66 & 67.
123. Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 117, art. 32. As important as
the provisions themselves, the new Constitution abandons the socialist notion of
rights existing only with correlative duties. In the amended Constitution, the du-
ties are sharply curtailed and do not correspond to rights. They include the duty
to defend the country, to pay taxes, to serve on juries, and to protect the environ-
ment. Amendments to the Constitution, 8upra note 117, part 6.
124. LAWYERS COMMInT= FOR HUmAN RiGHTS, aupra note 70, at 56.
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as an aspirational document seldom invoked as the basis for
a judicial decision. Thus far, constitutional reform in these
areas has had little practical impact on the criminal justice
system. Only when trial courts begin to use the Constitution
in their decisions will the new provisions acquire true signifi-
cance. The new Constitutional Court offers some hope that
the Constitution will become a useful judicial tool, although
up until now this court has ruled mostly on the constitution-
ality of laws and decrees, and not on the constitutionality of
official actions. The Court has not yet demonstrated an abili-
ty to provide meaningful remedies to individual litigants in
civil liberties cases."2
Despite these piecemeal changes, the law reform move-
ment has been unable to generate comprehensive reform
legislation. While many drafts of substantive and procedural
criminal codes have been published and discussed, none are
close to passage."2 As a result, the substantive criminal
code to this day retains many provisions that are holdovers of
antiquated ideology, reminders of the use of the criminal
justice system for political and social engineering purposes.
Many of the state crime articles are ideologically obsolete,
and a long list of economic crimes that would be considered
normal business practices in the rest of the industrialized
125. The statute governing the Court provides for jurisdiction in such cases.
See Zakon RSFSR o konstitutsionnom sude RSFSR [Law of the RSFSR on the
Constitutional Court of the RSFSR], gl. 3, Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 30, Item
No. 1017 (1991), translated in FBIS-USR, Sept. 10, 1991, at 21. In January 1993,
the Court reportedly had 40 cases under consideration pursuant to this jurisdic-
tion. Most of these cases concerned labor disputes over pensions and other com-
pensation. Ostapchuk, Konstitutsionnyi sud--pravozashchitnik [The Constitutional
Court-Defender of Rights], NEZAVISIMAA GAZErA, Jan. 27, 1993, at 2. See also
LAWYERS COMMrrTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 70, at 68 (reporting an age
discrimination complaint decided by the Constitutional Court in 1991).
126. See Carla Thorson, Toward the Rule of Law: Russia, RADIO FRME
EUR/RADIO LIBERTY, INC. RES. REP., July 3, 1992, at 41, 43-45 (describing abortive
attempt to pass new criminal codes in 1990-92).
1998] 555
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
world' are still made criminal in Russia, even if not all of
these provisions are now being vigorously enforced."
The criminal procedure code is also inadequate because it
maintains the enormous and coercive power of the procuracy.
A law on the procuracy passed in 1992 did little more than
confirm the procuracy's control over every aspect of the crimi-
nal justice system."
Penal reform has followed the same pattern, but with an
even smaller constituency of supporters. Under Interior Min-
ister Vadim Bakatin and his Chief of Corrections, General
Vladimir Guliaev, Soviet and Russian prisons began an un-
even course of reform"8 in 1988 that was hindered by polit-
ical indifference, economic constraints, and ideological con-
flict.1"' The reforms were dictated by the breakdown of the
system. Inhumane overcrowding, the physical deterioration of
facilities, and other squalid conditions contributed to a sharp
increase in prison disturbances that threatened MVD person-
nel. Economic collapse crippled the once profitable prison
industry and resulted in a decrease of government funds for
127. See, eg., UK RSFSI, art. 88 (speculation in currency and securities); art.
154 ('speculation, that is the buying up and resale of goods or other articles for
the purpose of making a profit') (1991).
128. The stepped-up enforcement of the crime of currency speculation at the
end of 1992 demonstrates that dormant laws can be revived easily to suit political
ends. See Survey of Currency Exchange Markets: Currency Trading Has Become
Dangerous, KOMMERSANT, Dec. 7, 1992, at 8, translated in FBIS-USR, Jan. 16,
1993, at 1.
129. Zakon Rossiskoi Federatsii o prokurature Rossiskoi Federatsii [Law of the
Russian Federation on the Procuracy of the Russian Federation], Vedomosti RF,
Issue No. 8, Item No. 366 (1992), translated in RUSDATA DIALINE-RuSLEGISLmNE,
available in LEXIS, World Library, SOVLEG File.
130. Chief among the improvements were the marked decrease in systemic
physical abuse of prisoners by guards in correctional facilities, an end to the with-
holding of food as a means of punishing violations of prison rules, and the en-
hancement, on an experimental basis, of privileges such as family visits, furloughs,
and telephone calls, mostly with female prisoners. HELaINKI WATCH, PRISON CON-
DMONS IN THE SOViET UNION: A REPORT ON FAcIUrE IN RUSSIA ND
AzEpxAuAN 20, 22, 43, 46 (1991) [hereinafter PISON CONmONS].
131. Bakatin's career proved short-lived; in the beginning of 1990 he was re-
placed by former Latvian KGB chairman and subsequent coup plotter, Boris Pugo.
556 [Vol. XIX:2
1993] CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN RUSSIA 557
the prison system. The response was a move toward self-fi-
nancing that made operation of prison facilities even more
difficult.y12
However, it was not until 1992 that amendments were
passed to the Russian law on penal facilities, and they are
fragmentary at best. The amendments contain guarantees of
respect for prisoners' freedom of conscience"RI and personal
safety vis-a-vis other prisonerss" and provide for many im-
provements in their daily lives." The law also contains a
provision for legislative oversight of penal facilities, but not
independent of the MVD. For the first time, the law speaks
of disciplinary or criminal penalties, including dismissal from
the MVD, for prison workers who act in an "inhumane" man-
ner." Prison officials are obligated to deliver prisoner com-
plaints to the procuracy, judiciary, or other governmental
132. See generally PRISON CONDInONS, supra note 130.
133. See Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v
Ispravitel'no-trudovoi kodeks RSFSR, Ugolovnyi kodeks RSFSR i Ugolovno-
protselssual'nyi kodeks RSFSR [Law of the Russian Federation on Introduction of
Amendments and Additions to the Correctional Labor Code of the RSFSR, the
Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR],
Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 29, Item No. 1687 (1992), translated in FBIS-USR, Sept.
1, 1992, at 10, 11 [hereinafter Labor Code Amendments] (creating article 81 of the
Ispravitelno-Trudovoi Kodeks [1TK RSFSR] [Correctional Labor Code]).
134. Al (creating ITK RSFSR, art. 82).
135. For example, male prisoners are now permitted to wear facial hair or to
shave every day, female prisoners can wear clothing of their choice rather than a
prison uniform. I& (codified at ITK RSFSR, art. 22). Many categories of prisoners
are allowed to receive money from outside the prison to purchase goods at the
prison commissary. Icl (codified at ITK RSFSR, art. 24). Restrictions on reading
material have been eased, although not eliminated. L (codified at ITK RSFSR,
art. 25). Prisoners are allowed to make telephone calls for the first time. Id (codi-
fied at ITK RSFSR, art 26). The number of letters prisoners are allowed to send
and receive is now unlimited. Id. (codified at ITK RSFSR, art. 30). Pregnant wom-
en, women with young children, and invalids receive a variety of additional privi-
leges.
136. Id (codified at ITK RSFSR, art. 117). See Anna Broydo, 'The Crosses" Are
a Powder Keg, NEVSKOE VREMEA, Nov. 25, 1992, at 1, translated in FBIS-USR,
Dec. 30, 1992, at 27 (quoting head of Russian prison system as saying 2,400 pris-
on staff were dismissed in 1992 and 44 criminal cases begun due to misconduct).
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entities without reading or censoring them, and prisoners are
entitled to receive written responses to their complaints.
13 7
In other substantial respects the penal law remains the
same. Compulsory labor remains the cornerstone of the Rus-
sian prison system," and prisoners remain subject to pun-
ishment for refusal to work.'3 No attempt has been made
to ameliorate the horrendous overcrowding in the prisons and
pretrial detention centers.'40 Conditions in punishment cells
remain the same, with warm clothing denied the prisoners,
pallets that serve as beds, as well as a suspension of privileg-
es. 4' And the procuracy, the body responsible for prosecut-
ing defendants, is still primarily responsible for protecting
prisoners' rights and dealing with their complaints.42
A modest amnesty passed in 1992' demonstrated the
137. Labor Code Amendments, supra note 133 (codified at ITK RSFSR, art. 36).
138. Labor Code Amendments, supra note 133, (codified atITK RSFSR, art. 37)
('Every convict is obliged to work.); Shumikhin & Rozhkov, Reforma ugolovno-
iapolnitel'nogo zakonodatel'8tva v usloviiakh perekhoda k rynochnoi ekonomike
[Reform of the Criminal-Correctional Legislation in Conditions of Transition to a
Market Economy] GOs. I PRAVO, Issue No. 7, 1992, at 54 (noting that the main
thrust of the colony system was and continues to be production). This aspect of
the Russian prison system has been criticized by many commentators. See, e.g.,
Abramkin, Shag Vpered na meste [One Step Forward without Advancing],
ROSSiySKA GAZFTA, July 21, 1992, at 1, 2, translated in FBIS-USR, Aug. 7, 1992,
at 25.
139. PRISON CONDMIONS, supra note 130, at 41. In recognition of the difficult
economic reality, where many prison factories are forced to stand idle due to a
lack of materials, the law now specifies that prisoners cannot be punished for
failure to fulfill quotas for such reasons beyond their control. Labor Code Amend-
ments, supra note 133 (codified at ITK RSFSR, art. 53).
140. Part of the problem is a lack of money to build new prisons. Equally im-
portant is the failure to institute a real bail system and to curb the use of pretri-
al detention by the procuracy as a coercive tool to extract confessions from
detainees.
141. Labor Code Amendments, supra note 133 (codified at ITK RSFSR, art. 54).
142. ITK RSFSR, art. 11. See V. Abramkin & lu. Chizhov, V POMOSHCH'
UZNIKU: KAK VYZHrT' V SOVETSKOI TIURME (1992) (prisoner rights handbook that
instructs that the majority of prisoner complaints must be directed to the
procuracy).
143. Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiskoi Federatsii ob amnistii [Resolu-
tion of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on Amnesty], Vedomosti RF,
Issue No. 27, Item No. 1565 (1992), translated in FBIS-USR, July 29, 1992, at 21;
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public unease and official opposition to criminal justice re-
form, particularly reform to ameliorate conditions for con-
victs. A previous attempt to pass similar legislation failed in
the wake of hysterical claims by the Procurator General that
400,000 prisoners (roughly two-thirds of the prison popula-
tion) would be released if the amnesty were approved.'"
Another report falsely claimed that violent criminals would
be amnestied.'
The reasons for the failure of broader criminal justice re-
form on the statutory level are varied. One is that the topic
has received relatively little attention from lawmakers preoc-
cupied with a collapsing economy,"4 armed conflict,147 and
a paralyzing struggle for political power between the execu-
tive and legislative branches.' s Other reasons are struc-
tural: an ever more serious shortage of money and talented
Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiskoi Federatsii o poriadke primenenlia
Postanovlenii Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiskoi Federatii ob amnistii [Resolution of
the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on the Procedure for Implementing
the Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on Amnesty],
Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 27, Item No. 1666 (1992), translated in FBIS-USR, July
29, 1992, at 22.
Some offenders were released immediately (MVD estimates were 20,000
prisoners). M. Mitiukov & L. Ivanov, Ne tak strashna amnitia, kak ee maliuiut
[Amnesty is not as Terrible as They Say], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA, July 14, 1992, at 4,
translated in FBIS-USR, July 24, 1992, at 21. Others had their sentences reduced
(MVD estimates were 40,000). Valeri Rudnev, Rosa ia Obiauliaet amniatiia [Rus-
sea Explains the Amnesty], IZVESTIIA, June 20, 1992, at 2, translated in FBIS-USR,
July 3, 1992, at 34.
144. Rudnev, supra note 143; Mitiukov & Ivanov, supra note 143.
145. Rudnev, supra note 143.
146. Gross domestic product fell approximately 20% per year in 1991 and 1992,
with a similar drop predicted for 1993. Aleksandr Frenkel, Forecast: Russia's Econ-
omy in 1993, DELOvOI MuR, Jan. 5, 1993, at 6, translated in FBIS-USR, Feb. 24,
1993, at 52, 54-55. By the beginning of 1993, inflation was running close to 25%
per month. Glazachev & Iakovlev, Do giperinfliataii odin shag [One Step Toward
Hyperinflation], NEZAVISIMAiA GAzETA, Feb. 2, 1993, at 4.
147. Russian troops from 1992 to 1993 were engaged in military or 'peacekeep-
in? actions in South Ossetia and Abkhaziia, Tadjikistan, the Armenia-Azerbaijan
war, Moldova, and Ingushetiia.
148. The April 1993 referendum, in which voters gave a vote of confidence to
President Yeltsin, was but another inconclusive battle in this struggle.
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personnel keeps the defense bar and the judiciary from ful-
filling their role as guardians of due process'49 and keeps
the MVD from building new prisons, refurbishing old ones,
and paying salaries sufficient to attract conscientious employ-
ees.
Just as important, .in the wake of a rising crime rate"W
and the dislocation of Soviet society on all levels, the reform
movement has failed to create any consensus among politi-
cians, the law enforcement community, and the general pub-
lic of what the criminal justice system should look like in the
post-Soviet era. Each step toward reform has been accompa-
nied by a small step back, as politicians, like their American
counterparts, strive to appear "tough on crime." In addition
to the stifling of comprehensive reform legislation, the result
has been a series of exhortative statutes and decrees on law
enforcement that have little practical impact except to make
comprehensive reform all the more unlikely.'5'
149. Some lawyers the author knows spend more time out of economic necessi-
ty pursuing such sidelines as chicken farming than practicing law.
150. Statistics for the first 10 months of 1992 reveal an increase in reported
crimes of 28.8% over the same period the previous year, to more than 2.2 million.
This includes an increase in robbery by 61%, an increase in theft by 60%, and an
increase in murder and attempted murder by 35.6%. Gordenko & Tsarev, The
Forecast Does Not Promise Peace, TRUD, Dec. 1, 1992, at 2, translated in FBIS-
USR, Dec. 11, 1992, at 68, 69 (citing Ministry of Internal Affairs statistics). Statis-
tics for 1989 and 1990 showed a similar increase. See Golik, Prestupnost' v
SSSR: problemy starye i nopye, 2 Soy. Gos. I PnAvo 20, 20-21 (1991).
151. See, eg., Decree of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian ,Federa-
tion on the State of Lawfulness and the Struggle Against Crime and Corruption,
ROSSUSKAIA GAZETA, Dec. 17, 1992, at 6, translated in FBIS-SOV, Dec. 30, 1992,
at 31 (calling on government to consider, pass, or implement a long list of mea-
sures ranging from criminalizing money laundering, to ensuring that Russian pris-
ons comply with U.N. standards, to criminalizing calls for violating the territorial
integrity of Russia); Talalaiev, Boris Yeltsin Addresses AU-Russia Conference on
Problems of the Fight Against Organized Crime and Corruption: Full Text of
Speech, ITAR-TASS WORLD SERvICE, Feb. 12, 1993, translated in FBIS-SOV, Feb.
16, 1993, at 25; Nabliudenie [Monitoring], MOSKOVSKM NOVOSTI, Jan. 31, 1993,
at 4, translated in FBIS-SOV, Jan. 28, 1993, at 26 (quoting Russian Vice Presi-
dent Aleksandr Rutskoy. *We are spending our whole time trying to create laws to
fit the Declaration of Human Rights, while the criminal world should be being
mercilessly punished.).
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This failure to reach a consensus has serious consequenc-
es for the abolition of capital punishment. Human rights
reforms in Russia fall on a spectrum of popularity and con-
troversy. Reforms in the civil law sphere, such as laws guar-
anteeing freedom of speech, assembly, and association,152
have garnered the greatest popular and political support. The
popularity of such measures has been due in large part to the
perception that they were designed to protect the rights of
the law-abiding. Reform of criminal law has been more
controversial, and of penal law still more so. Reform of the
death penalty, which concerns the rights of those judged by
the criminal justice system to be society's most reprehensible
pariahs, lies at the opposite extreme of public opinion. As is
demonstrated below, death penalty reform has proven captive
to political leaders who lack the will to oppose popular opin-
ion on this issue.
III. DEATH PENALTY REFORM
The movement to abolish the death penalty in Russia
has been rejuvenated by the revelation of a corrupt and unre-
liable criminal justice system, and by the attempts at reform
noted above. Skepticism regarding the criminal justice sys-
tem has been as much a driving force behind the current
calls for abolition as the morally absolute objections to the
death penalty. The execution of innocent people has been a
very real problem in the former Soviet Union, although the
extent of this practice cannot be determined.1"
152. See supra note 69.
153. See Valerii Konovalov, Cases of Erroneous Passing of the Death Sentence
in the Soviet Union, RADIO FREE EuR/RADIO LIBERTY, INC. RES. REP., July 1,
1987, at 1 (reporting press accounts of death sentences erroneously passed, but in
most cases, eventually overturned before execution). Based on the extreme incom-
petence of the procuracy in these cases, Konovalov speculates that some of these
cases resulted in erroneous executions, and in a subsequent report he confirms
this for at least one case. Valerii Konovalov, The Death Penalty in the USSR,
1987, RADIO LIBERTY RES. BULL, Jan. 25, 1988. In at least one other reported
case, the 1992 conviction of a mass murderer (based on his confession) revealed
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The period between the Khrushchev and the Gorbachev
eras saw occasional calls for abolition of the death penal-
ty." ' Andrei Sakharov, one of the only vocal supporters of
abolition during that time, is considered the father of the
contemporary movement to abolish capital punishment. In
1972 he gathered signatures on an abolition petition that he
sent to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. His opposition
was absolute: he wrote that the death penalty "contradicts
moral sensibility" and "cannot be justified by any general
social considerations."" Yet his opposition was profoundly
influenced by the abuses which he saw and personally'experi-
enced in the Soviet criminal justice system." Sakharov dis-
dained the use of the death penalty as a deterrent 57 and
found it "disproportionate for the vast majority of
crimes."" He also dismissed the propriety of the penalty
for the sake of retribution, arguing that in no case is such a
degree of retribution justified.
that a prior suspect who had beeh executed for the same crimes 14 years before
was in fact innocent. See Serge Schmemann, Citizen 'CM Russia Opens Files on
Serial Killings, N.Y. TdEs, Apr. 4, 1992, at A3.
154. See, eg., Albert Motivans & Elizabeth Teague, Capital Punishment in the
USSR, RADIO FREE EuR/RADIo LIBERTY, INC. RES. REP., June 26, 1992, at 67, 68.
155. ANDRE! D. SAKHAROV, SAKHAROV SPEAKS 240 (Harrison E. Salisbury ed.,
1974).
156. ANDREi D. SAKHAROV, MEMoIRS 655 (Richard Lourie trans., 1990) (the
death penalty is particularly heinous in the USSR because of the 'backward and
dismal condition of our criminal justice system, its subservience to the state ma-
chine, the prevalence of bribery and corruption, and the frequent interventions of
local big shots in judicial procedures."). In arguing against the death penalty,
Sakharov notes some of the particular failings of the criminal justice system: 'su-
perficial and prejudicial investigation, ... the impossibility of obtaining review of
clearly mistaken or dubious verdicts .... beatings during police questioning." Id.
157. Id. at 653 (I reject the notion that the death penalty has any real deter-
rent effect whatsoever on potential criminals. I am convinced that the contrary is
true-that savagery begets only savagery."). See also id. at 239.40, 502 (criticizing
cases in which the death penalty was being used for didactic purposes).
158. I& at 654.
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In the 1970s Sakharov's appeal fell on the deaf ears of
the Soviet bureaucracy; even intellectuals of the period were
reluctant to speak out for fear of official persecution.1"
In the Gorbachev 1980s, however, the arguments for and
against the death penalty were played out in the public are-
na. In 1987 the liberal weekly, Ogonek, ran an article in
which Aleksandr Iakovlev, a prominent criminal law scholar,
called for the abolition of the death penalty. His arguments
were similar to Sakharov's, if slanted a bit toward the prag-
matic: the death penalty was of little deterrent value; no
criminal justice system, in particular the Soviet one, could be
relied upon to apply the death penalty infallibly; the death
penalty was legally sanctioned murder; and not even the
government had the right to deprive another of life.l"'
Iakovlev also echoed an argument often heard among crimi-
nal justice reformers and human rights activists: by abolish-
ing the death penalty, the USSR would be joining the "ma-
jority of developed nations." 2 The debate has continued
159. Id. at 364-65.
160. Iakovlev claimed that after the imposition of the death penalty in 1962 for
large-scale theft of state property, the number of such offenses grew rather than
declined. He also argued that its widening use created an incentive to commit
graver crimes; a rapist with the knowledge that he faced the death penalty might
be more likely to kill his victim to eliminate an eyewitness, since the penalty for
the rape and murder would be the same, namely death. Allova, Vremia Milovat"
[Time to Show Mercy], OGONEK, Aug. 15, 1987, at 29. See also Ustinou, supra note
81, at 88 (noting the increase in serious theft and bribery even after these crimes
were made capital in 1962).
161. Allova, supra note 160.
162. Allova, supra note 160. See also Ustinov, supra note 81, at 88 (noting that
death penalty had been abolished by most "civilized countries)). The United States
in an exception that has not escaped the notice of Russian commentators. Burobin
et al., Uzakonennoe ubiistvo [Legalized Murder], in PROTIv SMERTNOI KAZNI:
SBORNIK MATERuALOV [AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY- A COLLECION OF MATERIAlS]
4, 18-19 (1992) [hereinafter SEORNIK].
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throughout the popular media to the present day,' 3 as well
as in more scholarly venues."
The first concrete public step in death penalty reform un-
der Gorbachev occurred in January, 1991, when the then
Minister of Justice of the USSR, Sergei Lushchikov, held a
press conference at which death penalty statistics were re-
vealed for the first time." The data were fragmentary, but
represented an important advance in official candor."
163. See, eg., Rozhnov, Zakon Surova [The Law is Strict], OcoNEK, Oct. 1988,
at 20 (article by prison official criticizing use of death penalty, suggesting it was
applied in random fashion and that it was impossible to evaluate petitions for
amnesty fairly); Kardin, Crime and Punishment: Discussing Legal Issues, Moscow
NEWS, Apr. 26, 1987, at 13; Kelina, But Not at Once!, Moscow NEws, Apr. 26,
1987, at 13; Efimova, Smertnaia Kazn': Eltein za ili protiv? [The Death Penalty:
Is Yeltsin for or Against?], STOLrrSA, Issue No. 29(35), 1991, at 18 (discussing ef-
forts at statutory abolition of death penalty). See also KHOKHEIAKOV, supra note
70, at 3 (recounting debate about death penalty on television show 'Piatoe Koleso"
in around 1990).
164. See, ag., Ustinov, supra note 81, at 87, 88 (recommending abolition of the
death penalty with an increase in length of sentences, including life sentence);
Karpets, Vysshaia mera za i protiv [The Highest Measure for and Against], SOV.
GOs. I PRAVO, Issue No. 7, 1991, at 49; Chernilovskii, Smertnaia kazn': istoriko-
filosofskii aspekt [The Death Penalty: The Historical-Philosophical Aspect], Soy.
Gos. I PRAVO, Issue No. 1, 1991, at 128. The death penalty was the subject of a
seminar hosted by Amnesty International at the Conference on the Human Dimen-
sion, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, that occurred in Moscow
diring September and October 1991.
165. Until recently, criminology statistics have always been a matter of secrecy
and questionable accuracy in the USSR and Russia. Ger P. Van den Berg, Judi-
cial Statistics in a Period of Glasnost, 13 REv. SocIALIST L. 299, 311 (1987)
(analyzing statistics from 1970 through 1986 and concluding that statistics are
manipulated to 'show the effects of the policy of the new leadership"). See also
KHOKHRIAKOV, supra note 70, at 173-74; Nevinnaia, Arkadiy Murashe: 'In the
Past This Riff-Raff Would be Afraid to Show up in Moscow's A Far From Optimis-
tic Interview with the Capital's GUVD [Main Internal Affairs Administration Chief],
TRUD, Aug. 20, 1992, at 4, translated in FBIS-USR, Sept. 4, 1992, at 76 (noting
how crimes are unreported by officials in order to produce favorable statistics).
166. The data provided were for 1985-88: In 1985, 13,081 people were convicted
of capital crimes, 770 were sentenced to death, and 20 of these were eventually
pardoned. In 1986 the numbers were: 11,744 convicted, 526 sentenced to death, 41
eventually pardoned.* In 1987 the numbers were: 7,590; 344; 47. In 1988: 5,827;
271; 72. Lushchikov did not reveal how many people were actually executed in a
given year, although one can infer that the number sentenced to death and not
pardoned were in fact executed, although not necessarily in the same year they
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The data revealed that, behind the scenes, death penalty
practice under Gorbachev was changing considerably, with a
sharp decrease in convictions for capital crimes and a con-
were sentenced. Motivans & Teague, aupra note 54, at 69; Gubarev, supra note
58, at 1.
Other frequently inconsistent statistics were subsequently reported in the
Russian press. See, eg., Rubnikovich, Rossiskie sudy prodolzhaiut deistuovat' [The
Russian Courts Continue to Function], NEZAVISmAIA GAZETA, Oct. 2, 1992, at 2,
translated in FBIS-USR, Oct. 24, 1992, at 6; Illesh & Rudnev, Kak i za shto
sudiat v Rosaii [How and for What Are People Judged in Russia], IzvIsTHA, Apr.
10, 1992, at 2; Goriacheva, Rovno 249 let nazad imperatritsa Elizaveta vpervye
otmenila smertnuiu kazn" v Rosaii [Exactly 249 Years Ago Empress Elizabeth I
Abolished the Death Penalty in Russia], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, Aug. 13, 1992, at 1;
Kononov, Pravo na ubiistvo [The Right to Murder], TRuD, Aug. 18, 1991, at 6;
Konnov, SSSR po chislu smertnykh prigovorov zanimaet pervoe mesto v mire [The
USSR Holds First Place in the World for Death Sentences], NEzAvISIMAIA GAZgrA,
Sept. 28, 1991, at 6 [hereinafter First Place]. KONONOV, PRAVO NA ZHIZN" I
PEmENIE SMEENOi KAZ= V SSSR: TEzisY EKSPERTNOGO DOKLADA [THE RIGHT
TO LIFE AND THE APPLICATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE USSR: THESES OF
AN EXPERT REPORT] 3 (1991).
New data emerged for prior years as well: 24,422 were sentenced to death
between 1962 and 1989, 2,355 of whom received commutations from the amnesty
board and an additional 1042 of whom had their death sentences reduced to pris-
on terms on appeal. Gubarev, supra note 53; First Place, supra, More than 12,000
were reported executed in the period from 1975 to 1991. Nikolaev, Nravy i
nravstvennost': Strana neutomimykh palachei [Morals and Morality: A Country of
Indefatigable Executioners], MEGALOPoLis-ExPRESS, Oct. 3, 1991, at 14 (citing fig-
ures provided by Kononov).
Gubarev also notes that the 24,422 sentenced to death from 1962 to 1989
represented 6% of those offenders who were convicted of crimes for which the
death penalty was available. In the years 1985 to 1989, this percentage was 5.9%,
4.5%, 4.5%, 4.7%, and 5.1% respectively. Finally, Gubarev notes a marked decrease
in the percentage of death sentences handed down for convictions of intentional
murder under aggravating circumstances, from 23.5% of such cases between 1962
and 1966 to 10% between 1987 and 1989.
All of these press accounts differ from statistics compiled by Amnesty Inter-
national from records of the Russian Clemency Commission. Memorandum from
Tanya Smith, Feb. 18, 1993 (reporting the following data for Russia):
Total
Year Sentenced to Death Reversed Commuted Executed
1989 97 26 4 67
1990 206 28 2 176
1991 144 37 37 70
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comitant decrease in death sentences. Under Gorbachev the
death sentence became used almost exclusively for crimes of
violence.1"
Legislative reform efforts in the Soviet Union began in
the late 1980s with the circulation of draft substantive crimi-
nal codes proposing a complete abolition of the death penalty.
These efforts came to nothing, as the USSR Congress failed
to enact comprehensive criminal law reform of any kind.
The 1991 USSR Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation
promised a sharp restriction in the use of the death penalty.
The Fundamentals limited civilian capital crimes to high
treason, intentional homicide under aggravating circumstanc-
es, child abduction accompanied by violence, rape of a minor
under aggravating circumstances, and crimes against peace
and the security of humanity (a vague formulation that ap-
parently refers to war crimes or genocide).1"
The Fundamentals also restricted application of the
death penalty by gender and age: males who were below the
age of eighteen at the time of the commission of their crime
and females regardless of age were no longer subject to the
death penalty.1" The Fundamentals thus promised the
167. See, eg., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPoRT 1988,
at 220 (1989) (noting no reported executions for economic offenses in 1988 and
speculating that executions may have been suspended for such crimes). But see
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPoRT 1989, at 239 (1990) (re-
porting death sentence for embezzlement handed down in Turkmenia, with no
information on whether it was carried out).
168. Osnovy ugolovnogo zakonodatel'stva Soiuza SSR i respublik [Fundamen-
ts of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Republics], art. 40, Vedomosti SSSR,
Issue No. 30, Item No. 862 (1991) [hereinafter Fundamentals]. One commentator
suggests that the phrase "crimes against peace and humanity encompasses war
crimes, genocide, piracy, and crimes against international humanitarian organiza-
tions or their members. N.F. Kuznetova, TSeli i mekhanizm reformy ugolovnogo
kodeksa [The Goals and Mechanism of Reform of the Criminal Code], 6 GoS. I
PRAVO, Issue No. 6, 1992, at 78, 84.
169. Fundamentals, supra note 168.
The elimination of the death penalty for women is consistent with the solic-
itude shown to women in the penal system in general, a solicitation that is only
partly explained by the lower incidence of crime among women. For example,
there are no special regime labor colonies for women (which does not mean that
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tightest restriction on the use of the death penalty, short of
abolition, ever enacted in the Soviet Union.
The death penalty provisions of the Fundamentals did
not take full effect in most of the Republics either before or
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, for some-
what murky reasons.17 As a general rule, Fundamentals of
USSR law were not self-executing; they required positive
enactment in Republic codes to take effect. None of the Re-
publics enacted such legislation before the Soviet Union dis-
solved in December 1991. A Resolution of the Supreme Soviet
which accompanied the Fundamentals, however, provided
that the death penalty provision would enter into force from
the moment of its publication, that is, from July 19, 1991.171
The Commonwealth Treaty signed on December 8, 1991, is
perhaps dispositive; it provides that legislation of the Soviet
Union in effect at the time of the Treaty ceases to have effect
in the newly independent Republics.1" In practice, however,
women do not commit crimes that are theoretically punishable by special regime).
Women's colonies were also the first to benefit from experimental improvements in
privileges and living conditions during the Guliaev reforms. See PRISON CONDI-
TIONS, supra note 130, at 39-40. See also Fletcher, supra note 2, at 16 (quoting a
drafter of the death penalty provision justifying it by saying that women in prac-
tice are never executed; women have a 'specialr role in Soviet society; abolishing
capital punishment for women is politically acceptable, and any step toward abol-
ishing capital punishment is a good one).
170. In some Republics, such as Latvia, the death penalty was limited after
independence. Mezhdunarodnaia Amneatiia, SSSR. Perspektiva otmeny smertnoi
kazni [Amnesty International, USSR: Perspectives on the Abolition of the Death
Penalty], in SBORNIK, supra note 162, at 23, 31 [hereinafter Mezhdunarodnaia
Amneatiia]. In Georgia, the legislature reportedly abolished the death penalty for
economic crimes; in Uzbekistan, its use was widened to include the crime of rape
during a period of mass disorder. Kuznetsova, supra note 168, at 78-79. The use
of the death penalty is reportedly on the rise in Tadjikistan and Kazakhstan as
well. Interview with Viktor Kogan-Iasnyi, Co-Chairman of the Moscow-based Soci-
ety Against the Death Penalty and Torture, in Moscow, Russia (Feb. 3, 1993).
171. See Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR o vvedenii v deistvie Osnov
ugolovnogo zakonodatel'stva Soiuza SSR i respublik [Resolution of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR on the Entry into Force of the Fundamentals of Criminal Leg-
islation of the USSR and Republics], art. 2, Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 30, Item
No. 863 (1991).
172. Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 8,
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Soviet legislation continues in force on an ad hoc basis in all
the Republics."
Russia appears to be applying the Fundamentals in a
piecemeal fashion. The Russian Parliament in December
1991 passed legislation providing for only a minor reduction
in the number of capital offenses, eliminating violation of
hard currency regulations, theft of state property in large
quantities, and bribe-taking from the list of capital
crimes.17 Some commentators claim that Russia is restrict-
ing application of the death penalty to adult males, consis-
tent with the Fundamentals, although in the absence of any
implementing legislation.175 The death penalty remains in
the criminal code for more than twenty offenses, including
nonviolent crimes.1 76
1991, ar. 11, 31 I.L.M. 143, 145.
The RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution on ratification of the Commonwealth
Treaty provides that the norms of the former USSR" remain in effect in Russia if
they are not inconsistent with Russian law, and until corresponding Russian legis-
lation is passed. Postanovlenie verkhovnogo soveta RSFSR o ratifikatsai
Soglasheniia o sozdanii Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv [Resolution of the
Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on Ratification of the Agreement on the Creation of
the Commonwealth of Independent States], art. 2, Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 61,
Item No. 1798 (1991). Arguably, the death penalty provisions of the Fundamentals
are inconsistent with RSFSR law and hence do not apply under this resolution.
173. See generally Ger P. Van den Berg, Human Rights in the Legislation and
the Draft Constitution of the Russian Federation, 18 REV. CEN. & E. Eun. L. 197,
199-203 (1992) (discussing question of applicability of Soviet law in Republics that
are members of Commonwealth of Independent States).
174. See Zakon RSFSR o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Ugolovnyi kodeks
RSFSR, Ugolovno-protsessual'nyi kodeks RSFSR i Kodeks RSFSR ob
administrativnykh pravonarusheniiakh [Law of the RSFSR on the Introduction of
Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, the Criminal
Procedure Code of the RSFSR, and the Code of the RSFSR on Administrative
Violations], Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue No. 52, Item No. 1867 (1991). See KONONOV,
supra note 166, at 2 (reporting with assurance the elimination of the death penal-
ty for only the three offenses noted in text, and questioning whether any further
reduction had been achieved).
175. KONONOV, supra note 166, at 2.
176. One commentator suggests that, until the Fundamentals are codified, they
could be interpreted broadly to allow the use of the death penalty for 'analogous"
offenses such as murder of a militiaman. KONONOV, supra note 166, at 2 n.1.
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New drafts of the criminal code propose further limiting
the death penalty to intentional murder under aggravating
circumstances, 177 a restriction which would be consistent
with current Russian practice.
The death penalty has also figured in constitutional re-
form efforts. The Constitution was amended on April 21,
1992, to include the following article, similar to Article 7 of
the Russian Declaration of Rights and Freedoms:
Everyone has the right to life. No one can be arbitrarily de-
prived of life. The government strives for the complete aboli-
tion of the death penalty. Before its abolition, the death pen-
alty can be applied as an exceptional measure of punishment
for especially serious crimes against the person only pursuant
to the sentence of a court.
178
177. Kuznetsova, supra note 168, at 79.
178. Zakon Rossiskoi Federatsii ob izmeneniiakh i dopolneniiakh Konstitutsii
(Osnovogo Zakona) Rossiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki
[Law of the Russian Federation on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution
(Basic Law) of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], art. 26, Vedomosti
RF, Issue No. 20, Item No. 1084 (1992) (creating article 38).
A 1990 draft of the Constitution by the Constitutional Commission of the
RSFSR contained a provision limiting the death penalty to premeditated murder.
This provision reappeared in a February 1991 Commission draft, with alternative
versions of this draft including aggravated rape of a minor, and another version
limiting the death penalty to "grave crimes." Draft Constitution of the Russian
Federation, Feb. 21, 1991. Subsequent drafts of the Constitution contained no
death penalty provision at all, e.g., Konstituteiia Rossiskoi Federatsii-Proekt,
Sept. 15, 1991 (draft of the Constitutional Commission). See also draft printed in,
ROSsIISKAIA GAZErA, Oct. 11, 1991, at 3, translated in FBIS-USR, Oct. 25, 1991,
at 1.
By October 24, 1991, however, the draft of the Constitutional Commission
contained an article similar in substance to the one eventually enacted. Proekt
Konstitutsii Rossiskoi Federatsii, po sostoianiiu na 24 oktiabria 1991 g. [Draft
Constitution of the Russian Federation, as of Oct. 24, 1991], art. 21,
KONSTITUTSiONNI VESTNIK, Oct. 1991, at 84, 92.
Article 7 of the RSFSR Declaration, supra note 108, limited the death pen-
alty to "especially serious crimes," but did not specify "crimes against the person.*
The Declaration contained an additional requirement of jury participation in the
proceeding, although it was unclear whether this was required at the trial stage,
at sentencing, or both.
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While enshrining this aspiration in the Constitution may
be seen as an advance for death penalty opponents, this arti-
cle is similar to the formula contained in criminal codes since
1922. Given the unproven track record of constitutional re-
view,"7 it remains to be seen if this clause will provide any
basis for judicial review of capital sentences in individual
cases.
Constitutional reform is *still a live issue in Russia be-
cause of the failure to resolve the distribution of power be-
tween the executive and legislative branches,"s and other
draft constitutions circulating in 1993 contained variations
on the death penalty article currently in force. For example,
the July 14, 1993 draft of the Constitutional Commission of
the Russian Federation adds a requirement that death pen-
alties can be handed down only pursuant to jury trial.18'
President Yeltsin's April 1993 draft Constitution contained
the sharpest limitation on the use of the death penalty (short
of abolition) to date. Article 26 provided that the death penal-
179. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
180. A Constitutional Assembly convened in June 1993 in a thus-far unsuccess-
ful effort to resolve these issues.
181. Konstitutsionnaia Komissiia Rossiskoi Federatsii, Konstitutsiia Rossiskoi
Federatsii (Proekt) [Constitutional Commission of the Russian Federation, Constitu-
tion of the Russian Federation (Draft)], July 14, 1993, art. 20.
It is not clear whether the provision envisions juries to determine guilt or
to determine the sentence, or both. While jury trials have been used experimen-
tally in various republics, they are not yet in use in Russia. Current plans call for
the introduction of the jury system in five regions in Russia in 1993. Rudnev,
aupra note 92. See Law of the Russian Federation: On Making Changes and Addi-
tions to the RSFSR Law 'on the Judicial System of the RSFSR," the RSFSR
Criminal Procedure Code, the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, and the
RSFSR Code on Administrative Legal Violations, translated in FBIS-USR, Aug. 13,
1993, at 1 (laws creating jury system in Russia) (translation not available for gen-
eral distribution, on file with author).
Given public support for the death penalty, it is not apparent that leaving
sentencing to the jury would result in any decrease in the death penalty's applica-
tion, although one could expect that, in time, the rate of conviction might decrease
with a jury system. One Russian commentator expressed hope that the jury sys-
tem would lead to fewer death sentences and greater transparency in the sentenc-
ing process. Interview with Vikter Kogan-Iasny, supra note 170.
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ty could be used only in cases of premeditated murder and
felony-murder. 8 2 However, his July 12, 1993 draft broad-
ened the application to especially serious crimes against the
person.1
8
Perhaps the most important practical change to date in
the disposition of death penalty cases has been the revitaliza-
tion of the clemency process.1" Before Mikhail Gorbachev
was "elected" President by the USSR Congress of People's
Deputies in 1990, authority to grant commutations of the
death penalty lay in the final instance in the USSR Supreme
Soviet Presidium," as well as in the Supreme Soviet
Presidia of the Union Republics. The USSR and the Republic
Supreme Soviet Presidia had special clemency commissions
that analyzed clemency appeals, including death penalty ap-
peals, and made recommendations to the Presidia. The work-
ings of these clemency commissions were virtually unknown
to the public.
The first impact of the Gorbachev reforms on the clemen-
cy process was greater publicity surrounding its work and an
increasing receptivity to granting commutations of death sen-
tences. Republic-level commissions, in contrast, granted com-
mutations only in very rare circumstances.
The creation of the position of President of the USSR in
1990 and the vesting in the President of the authority to
grant clemency in death penalty cases after the exhaustion of
judicial appeals"s resulted in a new procedure for clemency
182. Proekt Konstitutsii (Oanovogo Zah'ona) Rossiskoi Federataii [Draft Consti-
tution (Basic Law) of the Russian Federation], art. 26, IzvEsTnA, Apr. 30, 1993, at
3, translated in FBIS.SOV, May 3, 1993 (Supp.), at 3.
183. Konstitutsiia Rossiskoi Federatsii (Proekt) [Constitution of the Russian
Federation (Draft)], July 12, 1993, art. 20.
184. Interview with Viktor Kogan-Iasnyi, supra note 170, provided most of the
information on the history of the clemency appeals process.
185. The Presidium reviewed cases that it received from a review commission
consisting of seven deputies from the Supreme Soviet. Reshetnikov, Poaleslovie k
vysshchei mere [The Afterword to the Highest Measure], IZVESTIIA, Oct. 1, 1990, at
3.
186. Article 121' (15) of the Russian Federation Constitution vests in the Presi-
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appeals. President Gorbachev established his own review
commission in November 1990 to replace that of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, and all decisions of that commision had to
be ratified by Presidential decree. 87 The creation of the
post of President, therefore, did not create an additional op-
portunity to appeal. Gorbachev's review commission dis-
pensed death penalty commutations more frequently than did
the old USSR Supreme Soviet.
After Boris Yeltsin's selection as Chairman of the Rus-
sian Supreme Soviet in 1990, the RSFSR clemency commis-
sion was revamped to include three opponents of the death
penalty and five moderate supporters. However, the new
commission did not commute appreciably more death sen-
tences, because an intractable Supreme Soviet Presidium
frequently refused the commission's recommendations to
commute.
President Yeltsin created a new review commission in
February 1992 consisting of thirteen members, a mix of writ-
ers, religious figures, jurists, and people's deputies. Death
penalty sentences are automatically reviewed by the commis-
sion1 8 with the President signing the final decree for com-
mutation or execution."
The most recent development in legislation affecting
capital punishment as of this writing was the passage in De-
cember 1992 of an amendment to the criminal code that pro-
dent authority to grant clemency.
187. The Commission consisted of 12 members, including deputies, jurists, and
members of social organizations. Details of the Commission's work are sketchy, but
one report indicated that between 1990 and 1991 the Commission reviewed 226
death sentences and recommended commutation of 18. The percentage of commut-
ed sentences was claimed to be higher than in the past. Alimov, Poslednee slovo -
za prezidentom [The Last Word-Before the President's], IZVESTIIA, Apr. 2, 1991, at
7. But see Reshetnikov, supra note 185 (reporting that Presidium Commission in
September 1990 considered 68 appeals and granted commutations to 7).
188. Other appeals must be lodged by the prisoner's counsel, parents, or by a
people's deputy on his behalf.
189. Interview with Tanya Smith, Amnesty International, in Moscow, Russia
(Mar. 6, 1993).
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vided for sentences of life imprisonment upon commutation of
a death sentence."9 This marks the first time since the
1917 revolution that life imprisonment is available as a form
of punishment, and undercuts a primary argument of death
penalty proponents that the previous maximum fifteen- or
twenty-year prison term would be too lenient for those offens-
es that presently carry the death penalty. However, the life
term has not been incorporated in the criminal code for par-
ticular offenses and is not yet available to the sentencing
judge. As of this writing there have been no reported cases of
life imprisonment being imposed, but the clemency commis-
sion is said to have delayed consideration of some appeals in
expectation of the new law.
Important changes in practice appeared as well in 1992.
While the number of death sentences for 1992-159-is con-
sistent with recent years, 1' there were only eighteen
executions,19 and no indication of a large increase in judi-
cial reversals of death sentences or grants of commutation. It
may be that other death sentences have been held in abey-
ance pending the implementation of life sentencing and that
many of those currently on death row might have their sen-
tences commuted to life in prison.
190. See Zakon Rossiskoi Federatii o vnesenii izmenenii v stat'iu 24
Ugolovnogo kodeksa RSFSR [Law of the Russian Federation on the Introduction of
Amendments to Article 24 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR], art. 1, Vedomosti
RF, Issue No. 1, Item No. 9 (1993), translated in FBIS-USR, Jan. 27, 1993, at 32.
191. See supra note 166. Statistics for 1993 were not available at the time of
this writing.
192. Telephone Interview with Ol'ga Alberteevna Shvarts, Dep't of Judicial Re-
form, Russian Ministry of Justice, in Moscow, Russia (Sept. 2, 1993). Clemency
Commission statistics, however, indicate only one execution in 1992. Interview with
Viktor Kogan-Iasnyi, supra note 170, and Interview with Tanya Smith, supra note
189. It is possible that the 17 additional executions reported by the Ministry of
Finance were of people sentenced prior to 1992, while the Clemency Commission
statistics referred only to those sentenced during 1992. However, neither the
Commission nor the Ministry could definitely account for the discrepncy. See also
Zalmanov & Skuz, To Execute or Pardon?, RossISKA GAZErA, Apr. 3, 1993, at 9,
translated in FBIS-USR, Apr. 14, 1993, at 29, 30 (reporting 16 executions in first
six months of 1992, without citing source).
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The curtailment in practice and legislation in the use of
the death penalty has not been without its setbacks. After
the break-up of the Soviet Union, those sentenced to death
were effectively denied a level of appeal due to the disappear-
ance of the USSR Supreme Court. Death penalty cases, usu-
ally heard in the regional (oblast') courts in Russia,"9 used
to be appealable to the Republic Supreme Court and then to
the USSR Supreme Court. Now the only recourse left a
death-row inmate after the Republic Supreme Court is an
appeal for clemency to the President. Even in Russia, high-
profile or politically sensitive criminal cases, including capital
cases, are heard in the Supreme Court, with the result that
the defendant cannot appeal a guilty verdict to an indepen-
dent appeals court. This lack of appeal violates Russia's obli-
gations under the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights."° Conditions on death row remain some of the
worst in the Russian prison system, with prisoners held for
months in isolation cells that resemble the punishment cells
used for prisoners who violate prison rules."9 Finally, the
number of death sentences has again risen from its lowest
point in 1989.'6
Despite revelations of the historical misuse of the death
penalty and the enormous problems and inequities in the
criminal justice system, public support for the death penalty
endures. The emergence of free debate on the subject has
193. In some republics, however, (for example, the Baltics, Armenia, Belarus,
Moldova and Azerbaijan) death penalty cases are routinely heard in the Supreme
Court, acting as a court of first instance. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
those convicted in these republics are effectively denied a judicial appeal.
Mezhdunarodnaia Amnestita, 8upra note 170, at 23, 35.
194. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(5), Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176. The problem is more acute in many of the other
former Soviet republics, where all capital cases are routinely heard at the trial
level by the Supreme Court. See aupra note 193.
195. PRISON CONDITIONS, supra note 130, at 29-30. Some of the few improve-
ments in conditions on death row is that inmates can meet with priests and other
religious figures, and they are now allowed to have a radio in the cell. Interview
with Viktor Kogan-lasny, aupra note 170.
196. See supra note 166.
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only confirmed that a sizable majority of the population op-
poses abolition of the death penalty, even if it may support
some limitations on its application.1" In one televised de-
bate on the death penalty, 112 out of 120 people in the studio
audience expressed a willingness personally to carry out the
sentence." The view against abolition is shared by Russian
parliamentarians" and undoubtedly by a majority of law
enforcement officials.'
A chief reason for this strong public support for the
death penalty is the steep rise in the reported crime rate,"'
some of it real, some of it undoubtedly due to more honest
reporting of crime statistics.' Coupled with other manifes-
tations of social upheaval, economic decline, and political
chaos, popular opinion sees the death penalty as a barrier
197. Recent poll results indicate that 62% of the Russian population agrees
that 'the death penalty is necessary," with 20% disagreeing and 18% not sure.. See
Motivans & Teague, supra note 154, at 67, 71. The numbers were similar in
Ukraine and the three Baltic Republics. These results are consistent with past
polling on the subject. In 1987 only 9% of a Moscow polling sample supported
abolition. Id. Another survey in 1988 in Moscow found 63% in favor of capital
punishment and 23% opposed. Id. And a 1990 poll found 67% of the respondents
in Russia advocating the retention or expansion of the death penalty. Id;
Bystrova, Doroga na eshafot [The Road to the Chopping Block], TRuD, June 11,
1992. See also Nikolaev, supra note 166, at 14 (claiming 1991 surveys show 80%
opposed to abolition, only 15-20% in favor).
198. KHOKHRIAKOV, supra note 70, at 3.
199. See Mezhdunarodnaia Amnestiia, supra note 170, at 23, 39 (reporting re-
sults of June, 1990 poll of 466 deputies of the Russian parliament, in which 87%
favored capital punishment).
200. Cf Rozhnov, supra note 163, at 21 (Deputy warden of labor colony, writ-
ing about abuses in use of death penalty, nevertheless rejecting abolition of the
death penalty as "unrealistic," because of the growth in organized crime and be-
cause popular opinion supported the death penalty).
In 1991 the author inspected approximately 20 detention facilities in Russia
and Azerbaijan. Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) personnel uniformly spoke in
favor of the death penalty. One labor colony warden began a conversation on the
topic by speaking critically of the inhumane use of the death penalty in the Unit-
ed States, only to add quickly, "yes, the electric chair is really barbaric. The sys-
tem in Russia is much better. one shot to the back of the head. No suffering."
201. See supra note 150.
202. See supra note 165.
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between the populace and a Hobbesian state of nature.3
The death penalty remains a powerful symbol of control in a
society accustomed to living under authoritarianism and
seeing few tangible results in the new permissiveness. G
Historical memory of the misuse of the death penalty
and the criminal justice system, which provided the impetus
for many of the reforms noted in Part II, has had limited
impact as far as abolition of the death penalty is concerned;
with the death of Communism, the general public has become
more concerned with self-preservation and does not see in the
use of the death penalty the opportunity for widespread
abuse of the innocent, but rather a tool to punish the guilty.
IV. CONCLUSION
What is to be done with the Russian criminal justice sys-
tem and with capital punishment? As a preliminary matter,
the lawmaking process must itself be reformed so that all
laws affecting the criminal justice system are freely debated
and published after enacment. 5 The rules of the clemency
commission are not publicly available, for example.' There
203. Cf. Gerasimov, supra note 88.
204. In a variation of the adage that under Mussolini at least the trains ran
on time, one of Stalin's interpreters is reported to have recently remarked: Look,
they don't even clear the snow off the streets. Why? Because no one is afraid. But
Stalin would have long ago shot a few people, and the streets would be clean. It
was, of course, severe, but it would work." KHOKHRIAKOV, supra note 70, at 4.
205. See W.E. Butler, The Rule of Law and Soviet Legal Transformations, 15
LAW & Soc. INQuIRY 527, 531 (1990) (citing recent case in which unpublished
regulation formed the basis for criminal defendant's acquittal). See generally Eu-
gene Huskey, Government Rulemaking as a Break on Perestroika, 15 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 419, 419 (1990) (4Rulemaking by the Soviet Government is remark-
able ... for its scale, its secrecy, and its refusal to respect basic principles of
technical rationality.').
A recent presidential decree attempts to impose transparency in the law.
making process, mandating that the government newspaper Rossiskie Vesti be the
official place of publication of all normative acts, similar to the U.S. Federal Regis-
ter. See Lev Chernenko, Commentary: Want to Safeguard Your Rights? Rely on
Documents Published in Rossiskie Vesti, RossisKIE VEsTi, Jan. 27, 1993, at 2,
translated in FBIS-USR, Feb. 5, 1993, at 4.
206. In fact, the Commission appears to be functioning without any rules at
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is a continued need to de-ideologize the criminal justice sys-
tem.' Crime must be recognized as endemic to Russian so-
ciety, as it is to any society, and not an artifact of capitalist
influences. In the substantive criminal code, this would in-
volve the further decriminalization of "economic" offenses
such as personal speculation, foreign currency trading, and
the like;" shifting to civil or administrative penalties for
other economic offenses such as tax violations, monopolistic
behavior, or commercial espionage; and the reduction in pen-
alties for certain state crimes. Other necessary changes are
the decriminalization of petty offenses;' creating new cate-
gories of offenses, if 4ecessary, to deal with such burgeoning
problems as organized crime; and increasing penalties for
repeat offenders and especially serious crimes.21°
In the area of penal law, fundamental reform requires:
the elimination of production as the raison d'etre of incarcer-
ation; the continued use of amnesties to reduce the prison
population, particularly to release those convicted of offenses
all, since the Supreme Soviet annulled the Resolution that guided the
Commission's operation in 1992, and none has been promulgated to replace it.
Interview with Tanya Smith, supra note 189.
207. See, eg., Framework of Criminal Legi lation, supra note 70, at 39 (recog-
nizing the 1960 criminal code, the basis for the one in effect today, as inadequate
because it is based on 'the ideas of class struggle and the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat').
Russian legal scholars express various views on the fundamental question of
the purpose of the criminal code. Kuznetsova sees the first goal of a criminal code
as being "prophylactic" in nature, that is, deterring crime from occuring in the
first place. (She duly cites Marx to support this idea). Kuznetsova, supra note 168,
at 80. Ustinov proposes that the goal of the criminal code be widened to include:
'the protection of the individual, the rights and freedoms of citizens, property,
natural resources, social and governmental interests, as well as peace and security
of humanity from encroachment causing substantive unrecompensable damages."
Ustinov, supra note 81, at 88.
208. Kuznetsova, supra note 168, at 83.
209. Kuznetova, supra note 168, at 78.80, 85.
210. Kuznetsova, supra note 168, at 85; Ustinov, supra note 81, at 90; Frame-
work of Procedure, supra note 70, at 43-44. Currently, the longest prison term
available under Russian law is 15 years, although death penalties theoretically can
be commuted to life imprisonment See supra text accompanying note 190.
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that would not now be considered criminal;21' stricter iso-
lation of serious from petty offenders; 12 better training of
and pay for prison personnel;213 use of bail in order to re-
duce overcrowding in pretrial detention facilities; and a
committment of resources to building new prisons.
In the area of procedure, fundamental reform requires a
reorientation of the goals of the criminal justice system away
from conviction at any cost toward the protection of
defendants' rights and safeguarding against erroneous or oth-
erwise unjust convictions. Such a change would require a
shift in power from the procuracy to the judiciary and de-
fense bar.214 A strong exclusionary rule is also essential,
particularly as long as there are no meaningful civil remedies
for the deprivation of defendants' rights.
The prospects for such criminal justice reform as outlined
above are bleak in the short term, due to the ever-deteriorat-
ing economy, the continued increase in crime, and the in-
creasingly strident political debate over Russia's future. Eco-
211. Viktor Sokirko's Society for the Protection of Convicted Entrepreneurs is a
non-governmental organization that has been addressing this issue in Russia vis-h-
vis economic crime. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 70, at
113-14.
212. Some commentators have even recommended abolition of the labor camp
system entirely in favor of closed prisons, arguing that incarcerating small num-
bers of prisoners in cells is a more effective way to isolate disruptive prisoners.
Shutikhin & Rozhkov, supra note 138, at 54, 56.
213. One proposed project discussed at a meeting on prison reform in Moscow
in November 1992 was the creation of a set of model prisons centered around a
school for training prison personnel. Funding for such a project remains the big-
gest obstacle, however.
214. See, ag., Fedorov, 0 sudebnoi reforme v Rossii [On Judicial Reform in
Russia], Gos. I PRAVO, Issue No. 6, 1992, at 3, 9, translated in FBIS-USR, Oct.
15, 1992, at 12, 13.
The 1992 law on the status of judges attempts to safeguard judicial inde-
pendene; however, it fails to guarantee life tenure, a reform long sought by Rus-
sian legal scholars. See Zakon Rossiskoi Federatsii o statuse sudei v Rossiskoi
Federatsii [Law of the Russian Federation on the Status of Judges in the Russian
Federation], Vedomosti RF, Issue No. 30, Item No. 1792 (1992), translated in
FBIS-USR, Sept. 1, 1992, at 4. Draft laws on lawyers have been criticized as
avoiding the issue of the edopusk system.
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nomic hardship precludes financially costly reform, such as
an increase in the number or quality of prisons, or an in-
crease in pay to members of the law enforcement communi-
ty-including judges, police, defense lawyers, and the
procuracy.
As of this writing in 1993, President Yeltsin is fighting
for his political life against an array of opponents in an
intractible parliament ranging from conservatives to unrecon-
structed Communists to Fascists. These opponents point to
the rising crime rate as evidence of the failure of Yeltsin's
(and Gorbachev's) brand of liberalism. Nikolai Fedorov,
Yeltsin's reformist Justice Minister, was a particular target
of attack at the emergency session of the Congress held in
March 1993 and resigned shortly thereafter.
The general public, although not necessarily supporting
the opposition, is terrified by the increase in crime, supports
most new law enforcement efforts, and reacts negatively to
any criminal justice reform that appears to be "soft on
crime." Joint army-police patrols, fiercely resisted as a move
backward to a police state when Mikhail Gorbachev unsuc-
cessfully tried to introduce them in 1990 and 1991,215 have
now appeared under President Yeltsin with apparently only
muted protests.
The criminal justice establishment remains badly frag-
mented on issues of reform. The judiciary and defense bar,
who would embrace procedural reform that enhances their
prestige and power, remain a weak political force and are
thus ill-suited to advocate such reform. The procuracy, jeal-
ously guarding its powers, cannot be expected to support any
reform efforts that would diminish them. In a December 1992
speech, Procurator General Stepankov criticized the legal
reform effort as focusing too much on improving the judicial
system, which is the procuracy's main rival for power, and on
protecting the rights of the accused. In the eyes of
215. HElSINI WATCit HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR, supra note 69, at 112.
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Stepankov, only the procuracy has the authority and the
ability to protect everyone's rights and win the fight against
crime.21
The failing economy and the power struggle between the
executive and the legislative branches will continue to preoc-
cupy politicians, and even those who support criminal justice
reform are likely to preserve their political capital for these
fights, rather than risk discrediting the liberal democratic
agenda by pushing criminal justice reform. It is likely that
statutory changes in the death penalty will fall victim to
similar political pressures. Yeltsin's proposed restriction of
the death penalty to premeditated murder and felony-murder
appears to have met such a fate at the 1993 Constitutional
Assembly.21
7
If Yeltsin's hold on power becomes tenuous, or if he loses
power, through legal or extra-legal means, the result is a
likely increase in state coercion through the use of the crimi-
nal justice system and the death penalty, as conservative and
even proto-fascist political forces come to the fore. Yeltsin's
opposition, having thus far voiced no coherent economic pro-
gram, may find a crackdown on crime to be a temporary po-
litical palliative and a facade behind which to reimpose au-
thoritarian rule. There is no guarantee that Yeltsin himself,
lately speaking about the possibility of imposing a state of
emergency or presidential rule, may not succumb to the same
temptation.
Of the reforms outlined above, the most likely to succeed
would be a carefully packaged new substantive criminal code.
A new code that presented a mixture of decriminalization
and creation of new offenses, the use of longer prison terms
with a decrease in the number of offenses carrying the death
penalty, for example, could prove politically acceptable.
216. Speech by Stepankov (Dec. 10, 1992) translated in BRITISH BROADCASTING
CORP., SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec. 14, 1992, auailable in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BBCSWB File.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
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Even were the criminal justice reforms outlined above to
pass, the rising crime rate could create greater pressure for
the increased use of the death penalty. If the criminal justice
system is perceived as capable of doing justice, death penalty
opponents will be stripped of what until now has been a very
potent argument against its use. If petty and nonviolent of-
fenders are dealt with more humanely and efficiently, the
criminal justice system, and in particular the prisons and
labor colonies, will become saturated with serious offenders
whose rehabilitation is unlikely and whose propensity for
recidivism is high. Frustration with the intractible crime
problem may prompt calls for an increase in the death
penalty's use. Even with long-term or life sentences as a the-
oretical option, the skyrocketing cost of incarceration 8
makes this option less attractive in practice.
The debate over the death penalty in Russia will remain
as polarized as ever for the foreseeable future. For many
Russian legal scholars, there is no room in an actual or ideal-
ized criminal justice system for capital punishment: they
advocate abolition, even in the face of contrary popular opin-
ion. Others will always believe the death penalty serves an
amalgam of deterrent and retributive motives, with the over-
riding justification that the public supports it. It is ironic
that in post-totalitarian Russia, public opinion is so often
invoked to justify the maximum level of legalized state coer-
cion. It is perhaps indicative of the lingering allure of totali-
tarianism that, despite the abuses of the death penalty
throughout Soviet history, the public continues to support it
as a contribution to social peace.
218. Barinov, Russian Prisons are Near Bankruptcy: Introduction of the New
'Trison Law' Will Cost the State 20 Billion Rubles, NEZAViSwMAIA GAZETA, Mar. 14,
1992, at 6, translated in FBIS-USR, Apr. 15, 1992, at 50, 51. In addition to rising
costs, economic dislocation has sharply eroded the value of prison production. See
Shumikhin & Rozbkov, supra note 138, at 55.
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